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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the battle among actors in the telecommunication value chain to define 
the meaning of FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory), which forms the basis 
for the IPR policy and standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing agreements in most standard-
setting organizations (SSOs). As a secondary goal, this thesis seeks to improve the theoretical 
understanding of the changing nature of value creation from an industrial to a knowledge-
based economic paradigm, particularly in relation to the changing role of patents to facilitate 
openness and regulate access. 
 
An investigation of the theoretical concepts that define FRAND and SEP value as well as an 
empirical investigation of the industrial dynamics and the interpretation of FRAND in the US 
judicial system is conducted. This includes an in-depth, single case study of the landmark 
Microsoft case as well as a comparative analysis across the four initial SEP/FRAND cases in 
US district court. Additionally, a comparative analysis of legal and market norms is conducted 
through case studies and doctrinal legal analysis from the theoretical perspective of the 
intellectual value chain. Finally, the concepts of patent holdup and holdout are analyzed in 
relation to mainstream economic theory, and patent holdout is further investigated through 
market data as well as interviews and a survey with industry experts. 
 
The results show that while FRAND-enabled standards have experienced historical market 
success, an expansion of the division of labor in the telecommunication value chain has 
created a profound divergence among market actors regarding the value of SEPs, often 
exceeding more than an order of magnitude. Concomitantly, the US courts have also produced 
diverse rulings in their attempt to value SEPs and set FRAND royalties with considerable 
implications on economic performance and efficiency. Additionally, several valuation 
principles are introduced regarding the determination of royalty base in patent damages that 
illustrate the importance of linking legal norms to the market norms of the standard in 
question. Furthermore, patent holdout is found to be a substantial phenomenon with specific 
strategies that differ in relation to actors in developed and emerging markets. Lastly, the 
concepts of holdup and holdout are shown to be used much differently in the current patent 
debate in comparison to mainstream economic theory leading to the proposal of a new, non-
pejorative framework based on a spectrum of asymmetric bargaining power positions ranging 
from circumstantial to systematic to systemic.  
 
Keywords: telecommunications, standards, standard essential patents, FRAND, patent 
holdup, patent holdout 
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To the two most important people in my life – my mother, who taught me I could do anything, 
and my wife, who reminds me what’s important. 
 
 
 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same, 
 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
 
- Robert Frost  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1  Background1 
 
Communication is fundamental to society, and information and communication technology 
(ICT), in particular, forms the backbone of the modern knowledge society (Steinmueller, 
2002). Similar to healthcare and education, its value cannot simply be understood by 
measuring the economic output from the ICT sector – its impact affects the bottom line of all 
firms and the general welfare of society as a whole. Its central importance leads us to label 
ICT as a welfare technology, where both its current functionality and future development is 
critical to socio-economic growth. As a welfare technology, ICT operates at the interface of 
public and private spheres, between government regulation and market forces, where its 
borders are determined by a constant struggle among diverse stakeholders with different 
ideologies, objectives, and strategies (both short term and long term). Thus, ICT as both a 
system of knowledge as well as a means to efficiently package and distribute knowledge is 
both facilitating as well as impacted by the transition from an industrial to a knowledge-based 
economy, which in turn is challenging the institutional infrastructure of society (Antonelli, 
Geuna, and Steinmueller, 2000).  
 
The telecommunications industry is currently experiencing a high-stakes battle where strong 
business interests are debating and defining the role of patents in the development of global, 
open standards.  In this context, the term smartphone wars, in plural, is apropos, given that 
two distinct wars regarding patents are taking place. While much of the attention in the 
popular press has focused on the war between Apple and Samsung, which is a relatively 
traditional industrial battle over competing products, a potentially more important intellectual 
property battle concerning the future of telecommunications in the knowledge economy has 
been ensuing in parallel (Eichenwald, 2014). This second smartphone war is not a 
conventional battle over the market share of products between horizontal competitors on 
product markets, but a battle among vertical collaborators over the appropriation of value 
between upstream technology owners and downstream product implementers. As such, the 
current conflict in the context of telecommunication standards could be seen as part of a wider 
paradigm shift from an industrial to a knowledge economy characterized by the increased 
direct commercialization of technology through intellectual property-based business models.2 
Thus market conflicts between vertical actors, such as technology licensors and device 
																																								 																				1	The	background	section	partially	uses	content	from	the	four	papers	in	this	dissertation.	2	Non-practicing	entity	(NPE)	is	an	appropriate	term	if	used	descriptively,	not	pejoratively.	
3	See Pettersson et al. (2015), Apple, Ericsson Sue Each Other Over Phone Patent Royalties, Bloomberg 
Business, retrieved at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/apple-sues-ericsson-to reduce-
2	Non-practicing	entity	(NPE)	is	an	appropriate	term	if	used	descriptively,	not	pejoratively.	
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manufacturers, over royalties regarding global telecommunication standards3 carry a 
potentially greater systemic, economic impact as it affects both the creation of global markets 
and the viability of a new division of innovative labor in the economy. 
 
This vertical conflict is also potentially much broader, encompassing not only smartphones 
but all markets built on standards developed through consensus-based standard-setting 
organizations (SSOs), where ownership of patents is allowed on the technology specifications 
of the standard.4 This includes many of the major SSOs in the field of telecommunications, 
including IEEE, ETSI, and ITU, where standard-essential patents (SEPs) are typically 
licensed under fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms among members of 
the SSO and third parties (Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012).5 While the traditional patent war 
among device makers is smoldering out, the battle over the value of SEPs is growing as the 
importance of standard-enabled markets in telecommunications and convergent industries 
grows. For example, the future development of Internet of Things (IoT) both for industrial 
applications (i.e. Industry 4.0) and consumer applications is predicted to greatly expand the 
number of connected objects as well as the number of technology standards and associated 
patents.6 
 
The conflict described above over SEPs among vertical actors in the telecommunication 
industry is amplified by the fragmentation of traditionally integrated firms into a value 
network of diverse actors with different strategic goals regarding technology and product 
development.7 Some firms view SEPs as a major source of revenue and others as a major cost 
of production. This heterogeneity in the value network creates a strategic conflict over SEPs 
that is played out not only on the market, but also through the courts, competition authorities, 
and the SSOs that set IPR policies that attempt to govern their use.8 Furthermore, academic 
discourse has played a significant role in defining theoretical explanations for the current 
conflict, such as patent holdup and royalty stacking, which has been influential in the policy 
debate despite a lack of empirical evidence (Farrell et al., 2007; Lemley and Shapiro, 2007; 
Galetovic and Haber, 2017; Galetovic, Haber, and Zaretzki, 2017).9 Adding complexity, 
																																								 																				
3	See Pettersson et al. (2015), Apple, Ericsson Sue Each Other Over Phone Patent Royalties, Bloomberg 
Business, retrieved at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/apple-sues-ericsson-to reduce-
royalties-on-phone-patents-1-	4	Lemley	(2002)	found	that	34	or	the	36	SSOs	studied	allowed	for	ownership	of	patents	in	the	standard	and	29	of	36	allowed	for	licensing	of	these	patents	on	reasonable	and	non-discriminatory	terms.	5	The	inclusion	of	SEPs	in	SSOs	is	typically	done	to	incentivize	participation	of	leading	technology	firms	in	the	standardization	process,	while	the	use	of	FRAND	commitments	is	used	to	facilitate	adoption	and	dissemination	of	the	standard.	
6	Gartner	predicts	a	growth	from	8.4	billion	interconnected	devices	in	2017	to	over	20	billion	in	2020	–	see	http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917.		
7	Major	market		actors	provide	different	value	propositions	to	the	telecommunication	value	chain,	such	as	devices,	infrastructure,	chipsets,	operating	systems,	content	platforms,	technology,	etc.	in	different	combinations.	
8	One	could	argue	that	national	politics	is	also	involved	given	the	size	of	the	telecommunication	market	and	the	impact	on	important	national	actors.	See,	for	example,	President	Obama’s	veto	of	the	US	International	Trade	Commission’s	exclusion	order	of	the	Apple	iPhone	based	on	a	SEP	asserted	by	Samsung	in	2013.	9	Even	Nobel	Laureates	have	weighed	in	on	the	topic	-	see	Lerner	and	Tirole	(2014).	
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Bekkers and Updegrove (2012) find that there is still a large diversity among IPR policies in 
SSOs and that they often lack clear goals, transparency, and an unambiguous definition of 
FRAND.10 This policy ambiguity, combined with an expanding multi-trillion dollar market 
and a growing division of labor, sets the stage for the battle to define the meaning FRAND. 
1.2 Overall Purpose and Scope 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to better understand how competing interests seek to define 
the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of SEPs. This, in turn, sheds light on the role 
patents currently play and potentially could play in the development and commercialization of 
telecommunication standards from both an economic performance and efficiency perspective.  
In doing so, this thesis aims to provide a framework for balanced guidance to support 
policymakers and market actors seeking to define an agenda for the development of patent 
policies and IP-based business models adjusted to wealth and welfare creation in an 
environment of open innovation. 11 Specifically, the thesis explores the battle among actors in 
the telecommunication value chain to define the meaning of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-
Discriminatory (FRAND), which forms the basis for the IPR policy and standard-essential 
patent (SEP) licensing agreements in most standard-setting organizations (SSOs). As a 
secondary goal, this thesis seeks to improve the theoretical understanding of the changing 
nature of value creation from an industrial to a knowledge-based economic paradigm by 
unveiling the conceptual issues, stakeholder interests, and policy impact of patents on 
economic performance and efficiency.  
 
The thesis focuses on the new role of patents as a key battleground issue at the interface of 
economic efficiency and business strategy in the telecommunication sector, where open 
innovation through standardization is critical to socio-economic growth. This requires the 
investigation of several inter-related institutional phenomena, including open standards and 
standard setting organizations (SSOs), collective rights agreements, and the concept of 
standard-essential patents (SEPs), which jointly operate to regulate competition and 
collaboration, stimulate innovation and reduce potential economic hold-up/out situations. 
Figure 1.1 below illustrates the relationship between the institutional phenomena under study 
in relation to their evaluation in terms of economic output (i.e. economic performance and 
efficiency). In particular, the phenomena of SEPs and FRAND (fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory) agreements will be investigated in the context of mobile telecommunication 
standards in the knowledge economy from an inter-disciplinary perspective, specifically 
economics, law, and innovation/technology management.  
 
																																								 																				10	It	should	be	noted	that	the	ambiguity	of	FRAND	is	not	a	necessarily	a	contractual	problem	that	is	simply	remedied	through	clearer	specification.	For	a	discussion	on	the	usefulness	of	incomplete	contracts	see	(Wright,	2013)	11	Open	innovation	was	coined	by	Henry	Chesbrough	(2003)	and	has	grown	to	have	numerous	meanings	in	different	business	settings.	For	this	dissertation,	open	innovation	will	refer	to	collaborative	efforts	among	market	actors	to	develop	and	commercialize	knowledge	through	both	formal	and	informal	processes.	The	concept	of	openness	will	be	explored	in	relation	to	intellectual	property	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	collaborative	technology	platforms,	such	as	standards.	
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Figure 1.1     Diagram of the relationship among the key phenomena under study 
 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
 
The concept of FRAND has a long history with regards to standard-setting and antitrust 
remedies The first formal SSO FRAND policy was initiated by the American Standards 
Association in 1959, three years after the antitrust consent decrees against AT&T and 
Western Electric (Contreras, 2015). In the field of telecommunications, early battles over IPR 
issues in ETSI began around the GSM standard in the early 1990s and resulted in the adoption 
of FRAND IPR policies (Iversen, 1999; Bekkers et al., 2002). With this background, below is 
a description of the key delimitations of the investigation into FRAND for this thesis:  
 
• This thesis focuses on the current battle over FRAND from 2007 to 2017 in the era of 
established, global telecommunication markets enabled by global standards and the 
growth of smart mobile devices, in particular, smartphones and the emergence of 
Internet of Things.12 
• Open, consensus-based telecommunication standards, as opposed to de facto 
standards, are discussed in general, but 802.11x, H.26x, and 3G/4G/5G cellular 
standards are addressed in particular. 
• Most of the investigations in the thesis have taken place in the context of the US 
market and legal system, though information from global markets, courts, SSOs, and 
competition authorities have been employed as sources of data. 
																																								 																				
12	This	period	has	experienced	major	shifts	in	the	telecommunication	industry.	In	mobile	phones,	for	example,	large	new	actors	such	as	Apple	and	Google	have	entered	the	market	and	incumbents	such	as	Nokia,	Motorola,	and	Blackberry	have	exited.	On	the	mobile	chip	market,	ARM	and	Qualcomm	created	a	dominant	market	share	while	Intel	has	struggled	to	make	the	transition	to	mobile.		
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• The thesis has focused on telecommunication market actors from an SEP perspective 
in relation to their role in developing standards and implementing standard-enabled 
products. 
• The focus has been on patent holdup/holdout theory and the associated propositions 
that have become the key areas of contention over the meaning of FRAND. In 
particular, the concepts of royalty stacking/gap, royalty base, and patent trespass have 
been investigated in detail. 
• While several legitimizing arenas (e.g. courts, competition authorities, SSOs, and the 
ITC) have been reviewed at some level, the four initial FRAND cases held in US 
district courts were investigated in detail. 
 
 
1.4 Disposition of Study 
 
The main theoretical and empirical investigations that build the foundation for this thesis can 
be described in the following two phases: 
 
1. During 2013-14, a review of the scientific literature was conducted and compared 
empirically to four case studies representing the initial court decisions on 
SEP/FRAND royalties in the US district court system. This included the landmark 
case, Microsoft v. Motorola, and three subsequent cases, Ericsson v. D-link Systems et 
al., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, and CSIRO v. Cisco Systems. This resulted in two 
published journal articles (Paper 1: Heiden, 2016; Paper 2: Heiden, 2015) that 
deconstructed the SEP/FRAND valuation methodologies of the courts and related 
them to received theory on economic efficiency and new propositions regarding 
knowledge-based industry dynamics. This created a base for the understanding of the 
complex issues, interests, and impacts of SEPs and FRAND in the telecommunication 
context. Furthermore, the key commercial areas of contention were identified and 
connected to the key concepts used by the stakeholders to define the meaning of 
FRAND. Lastly, several new theoretical propositions were postulated towards an 
improved understanding of the value/role of patents in open standards in the 
knowledge economy.  
 
2. During 2015-16, the focus shifted to a deeper theoretical and empirical investigation 
of several key conceptual issues that have a great impact on the battle to define the 
meaning of FRAND. This resulted in a published journal article regarding the 
determination of the royalty base and the impact on patent damages from a knowledge 
economy perspective (Paper 3: Heiden & Andreasson, 2016) and a forthcoming article 
focused on the nature and evidence of patent trespass and the royalty gap as 
countervailing concepts to patent holdup and royalty stacking (Paper 4: Heiden & 
Petit, 2017). 
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In 2016, the main empirical findings and theoretical insights from the four papers were 
synthesized into five introductory chapters of this thesis. In chapter 2, the frame of reference 
is discussed providing the necessary theoretical background regarding the institutional nature 
of patents and how their norms are socially constructed, the changing norms of value creation 
in the knowledge economy, the, the role of SEPs and FRAND in telecommunication 
standards, and finally the development of the concept of patent holdup/holdout and its role in 
defining the conceptualization of the meaning of FRAND.13 In chapter 3, methodology and 
research methods are explained including the epistemological perspective of the author, the 
research strategy, design, and empirical methods as well as research quality criteria. Chapter 4 
provides a summary of the four papers and a description of their interconnection. Finally, 
chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the contribution of thesis and then presents several 
elements towards a social constructionist model of FRAND and SEP value and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
  
																																								 																				13	Excerpts	developed	in	Papers	1-4	will	be	re-framed	together	with	new	sections	and	bridging	text	to	create	a	holistic,	comprehensive	frame	of	reference	for	the	dissertation.		
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2.  Frame of Reference 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to better understand how competing interests seek to define 
the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of SEPs. This chapter presents the frame of 
reference for the thesis by exploring the changing economic, institutional, and industrial 
norms that define the context in which the current stakeholders find themselves debating the 
meaning of FRAND and the subsequent value of SEPs.  
 
This chapter does not seek to be exhaustive, but rather provide an introduction to the main, 
theoretical building blocks that form the foundation for the thesis, which is further elaborated 
on in the appended papers. Specifically, this includes (1) an epistemological perspective on 
patents, (2) a introduction to an intellectual value chain perspective on competitive advantage, 
(3) an overview of the context of FRAND in the telecommunication value chain, (4) a short 
review of the key competing economic theories being used to define FRAND over the past 
two decades, and (5) and initial conceptualization of the meaning of FRAND. The use of 
multiple moments is intentional, so as to be able to address the complex context of FRAND 
and fulfill the purpose of the thesis. This includes the linking of multiple theoretical fields, 
such as management, economics, and law on different theoretical levels, including metatheory 
(grand theory), formal/mid-range theory, and substantive theory.14 This approach facilitates a 
holistic investigation by reducing bounded rationality and supporting a more reflexive 
evaluation and development of theoretical propositions. 
 
The initial focus on a social constructionist perspective is done to facilitate deconstruction and 
the unveiling of the communicative game, so as to avoid a narrow positivistic approach, 
which is always tempting the social scientist to define an objective truth in a subjective 
reality. Furthermore, the use of the concept of “paradigm shift” is also done to support the 
exploration of a potential discontinuity between theory and reality as paradigmatic change 
creates the opportunity to move from normative closure (state of accepted reality) to a new set 
of norms (Kuhn, 1970). This illustrates the tension between market interests based on the 
clash of old and new norms in changing industries with large financial stakes. This, in turn, 
creates a tension as competing theories, especially substantive theories, from different 
paradigms are used to define the reality of institutions that impact both economic performance 
and efficiency. Below is an introduction to the following sections of this chapter. 
 
Section 2.1 starts with a metatheoretical discussion of the institutional foundation of patents 
as social constructions from an epistemological (not simply ontological) perspective, 
providing a framework from which to deconstruct the communicative game that defines 
patents as institutional facts based on a communicative game on different legitimizing arenas. 
Section 2.2 continues with a mid-range theoretical discussion on the changing nature of value 
creation from an industrial to a knowledge economy in the context of a paradigmatic shift in 
market norms and structure. This primary focus is on the changing economic foundation of 
																																								 																				
14	See	Glaser	and	Strauss	(1967)	for	a	more	detailed	description	of	substantive,	formal,	and	grand	theories.	
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value creation through the development of adjacent value chains, business models, and a new 
division of innovative labor based on an increasingly dynamic role for patents. Section 2.3 
builds on the broader knowledge-based business challenges addressed in the previous section 
by providing an introduction to the historical development and the current role of SEPs and 
FRAND in open standards in the telecommunication industry. This reinforces the importance 
of the changing role of patents and modes of value creation within the specific 
telecommunication context. Section 2.4 provides a brief overview of the development of core, 
substantive theoretical concepts such as patent holdup/holdout and royalty stacking that frame 
the current battle to define the meaning of FRAND.15 Finally, section 2.5 provides an initial 
mapping and description of the conceptualization of the meaning of FRAND. This chapter 
ends with a concluding section presenting the overall research problem.  
 
 
2.1 The Social Construction of Patents (and Patent Value) 
 
One key institution in a society whose wealth and welfare is built on knowledge is the patent 
system. The perceived role and importance of patents in the development and 
commercialization of technology has varied over time and across industries during the history 
of the patent system with a concomitant effect on the perception of patent value. In recent 
history, with a starting point in the US in the 1960-70s, patents were seen as an anti-
competitive extension of monopoly power by a number of dominant firms, which led to a 
campaign of compulsory licensing on the part of the Department of Justice (DoJ) and Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) (Scherer and Ross, 1990). By the 1980s a pro-patent era began with 
the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC),16 The reversal of 
philosophy at the FTC from a static to a dynamic efficiency perspective, the effects of 
lobbying by large corporations, and the shift in ideological view that patents were central to 
the competitiveness of the nation (Granstrand, 1999). These changes all led to the 
development of patents as a valuable corporate asset though still largely within a traditional 
industrial paradigm focused on the protection of manufactured goods.  
 
In the 21st century, fueled by increased R&D and a growing awareness of the value of 
intellectual property, the number of patent applications and litigation rose exponentially,17 
creating what some have described as patent thickets in the software, telecommunications, 
semiconductor, biotechnology and other complex, multi-technology business areas that some 
believe threatens the development of both economic efficiency and innovation (Shapiro, 
																																								 																				15	An	extensive	theoretical	critique	is	provided	in	paper	4.	16	Henry	and	Turner	(2006)	conclude	that	“the	CAFC’s	changes	have	clearly	enhanced	the	value	of	patents	and	have	increased	the	incentives	of	patentees	to	sue	for	infringement”.	Merges	(1988)	acknowledges	the	role	of	the	CAFC	as	a	key	reform	that	strengthened	the	patent	system	but	questioned	the	extent	to	which	economic	success	per	se	should	guide	the	CAFC's	determination	of	patentability.	17	The	number	of	patent	applications	in	the	US	has	risen	six-fold	between	1983	and	2012	(www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm).	
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2001).18 While lacking rigorous empirical economic evidence, the specter of patent thickets 
and trolls combined with several high-profile legal actions19 led to calls for legislative and 
judicial reform throughout the 2000s culminating in the signing of the America Invents Act of 
2012 and several landmark judicial rulings. In particular, the US Supreme Court has been 
rather active in the 21st century reviewing cases of patent law and (re)defining issues related to 
injunctive relief,20 patentable material,21 obviousness of patent claims,22 research exemption,23 
and patent exhaustion.24  
 
In aggregate the recent legislative changes and judicial rulings in combination with the rather 
strong anti-patent rhetoric from the popular press potentially signal the beginning of a new 
patent era, epitomizing the struggle with the transition to a knowledge-based economy, where 
the main economic inputs, and increasingly outputs, are intellectual instead of physical.25 
Thus the new patent era is one in which the critical role of intellectual property to incentivize 
and govern open innovation, on one hand, is offset by the less productive rent-seeking 
behavior that accompanies the emergence of a new asset class on the other hand.26 Attempts to 
eliminate the negative behavior without harming the positive have been made more difficult 
by the fact that competing interests have purposely muddied the distinction between the two 
behaviors (i.e. when actors are seeking legitimate returns on their investments in innovation 
and when they are simply gaming the system).27 
 
The historical shifts regarding the fluctuating importance of patents discussed above illustrate 
the obvious but important ontological distinction that patents and their associated value are 
social constructions that are shaped and reshaped by legal, economic, and political forces over 
time. The concept of the patent is nothing more than a reflection of the value that is infused in 
																																								 																				18	While	patents	are	considered	a	means	to	stimulate	dynamic	efficiency,	Levin	et	al.	(1987)	postulates	that	”the	semiconductor	industry	of	the	1950s	and	1960s	provides	an	excellent	example	of	rapid	progress	in	accumulative	technology	that	might	have	been	impossible	under	a	regime	that	strongly	protected	intellectual	property”,	which	raises	the	question	as	to	whether	there	is	an	easy	choice	between	strong	or	weak	IP	regimes	in	regards	to	innovation	outside	of	a	given	technology	development	context.	19	See	NTP,	Inc.	v.	Research	in	Motion,	Ltd.,	418	F.	3d	1282	-	Court	of	Appeals,	Federal	Circuit	(2005),	where	the	threat	of	injunctive	relief	of	Blackberry	service	resulted	in	a	settlement	of	over	650MUSD.	See	US	FTC	Rambus	Consent	Order	(2007)	regarding	misrepresentations	or	omissions	from	SSOs.	20	See	eBay	Inc	v.	MercExchange,	L.L.C.,	547	U.S.	388	(2006)	21	See	Bilski	v.	Kappos,	No.	08-964	(2010),	Mayo	Collaborative	Services	v.	Prometheus	Laboratories,	Inc.,	No.	10-1150	(2012),	and	Association	for	Molecular	Pathology	v.	Myriad	Genetics,	Inc.	(2013)	22	See	KSR	Int'l	Co.	v.	Teleflex,	Inc.,	550	U.S.	398	(2007)	23	Merck	KGaA	v.	Integra	Lifesciences	I,	Ltd.,	545	U.S.	193	(2005)	24	Quanta	Computer,	Inc.	v.	LG	Electronics,	Inc.,	553	U.S.	617	(2008)	25	The	evolution	of	the	patent	system	and	its	use	by	market	actors	are	different	in	Europe	and	Asia	than	in	the	US	for	various	reasons	including	the	fragmented	IP	system	in	the	EU	and	the	relatively	young	but	fast	growing	system	in	China.	However,	the	issues	surrounding	the	use	of	IP	for	open	innovation	in	a	knowledge	economy	context	is	changing	most	rapidly	in	the	US,	even	more	than	the	EU.	For	example,	based	on	two	recent	US	Supreme	Court	decisions	(eBay	and	Myriad	Genetics),	the	US	courts	are	much	less	likely	to	grant	injunctions	on	patent	infringement	and	uphold	gene	patents	than	German	courts,	which	is	a	much	more	dramatic	change	for	the	US	than	for	Germany.	26	The	recent	wave	of	monetization	of	patents	through	licensing	and	litigation	has	created	the	view	of	patents	as	a	new	asset	class	in	the	eyes	of	the	financial	community.	27	Legitimacy	is	a	normative	concept	that	strikes	at	the	heart	of	the	current	discourse	on	the	role	of	patents.	Right	and	wrong	are	based	on	a	battle	of	ideology	and	interests	where	eventually	one	side	wins	the	right	to	set	the	rules.	
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it by the societal institutions and actors that define it. Thus it is not possible to separate the 
concept of a patent from patent value, which is why patents are not sought in regimes with 
weak enforcement. Without an enforceable claim of economic value, patents basically cease 
to exist.28 Recent events suggest a new patent era is evolving to challenge the norms of the 
pro-patent era that began in the 1980s. Below is are two theoretical models to describe the 
reification process of intellectual constructs that are useful for understanding how social 
processes (e.g. judicial disputes) during a reification stage can affect the norms and value of 
patents.29  
 
2.1.1 Patent Value as a Hierarchy of Norms 
 
Patents are social constructions, which means that their existence cannot be separated from 
the communicative actions of the actors that define them (Searle, 1997; Berger & Luckmann, 
1966). The social construction of patents can be modeled as a hierarchy of norms on two 
levels representing tools and blocks (see figure 2.1 below).30 Tools are rules and norms that 
reify institutional constructs (i.e. blocks).31Thus tools are used to build blocks, which 
represent reified institutional constructs and justified consequential norms within different 
contexts (Petrusson, 2004).32 For example, patent law can be seen as a tool that is used to 
define the rules and norms regarding patentability (i.e. tools), which can then be applied to the 
development of specific patents (i.e. blocks) with the consequential norm that the patent can 
be further used as property in commercial transactions among other norms of use. If patent 
law is unclear (e.g. its meaning is ambiguous in certain contexts) or lacks sufficient 
enforceability (e.g. the court system is ineffective or inconsistent) then it will operate as a 
weak tool, which in turn, will produce weak blocks, whose legitimacy will be uncertain, as 
will the norms of its subsequent use.33 The level of reification of institutional tools determines 
the reification of the blocks that are produced, which impacts uncertainty as well as both 
private and social value.  
 
 
																																								 																				28	The	same	can	be	said	for	all	economic-oriented	social	constructions.	29	Berger	and	Luckmann	(1966)	describe	reification	as	”the	apprehension	of	human	phenomena	as	if	they	were	things,	that	is,	in	non-human	or	possibly	supra-human	terms.”	It	is	through	the	process	of	reification	that	social	constructions	are	experienced	as	phenomena	that	exist	independent	and	separate	from	social	action.	This,	however,	doesn’t	mean	that	social	phenomena	are	actually	objective	in	the	ontological	sense	–	only	that	they	have	reached	a	state	of	normative	closure	within	the	given	societal	paradigm.	30	See	Petrusson	(2004)	for	a	discussion	on	intellectual	tools	and	blocks	as	core	to	a	norm-constructionist	understanding	of	entrepreneurship	in	the	knowledge-based	economy.	31	Berger	and	Luckmann	(1966)	state	“the	basic	‘recipe’	for	the	reification	of	institutions,	is	to	bestow	on	them	an	ontological	status	independent	of	human	activity	and	signification”.		32	Latour	(1996)	uses	the	concept	of	quasi-objects	and	networks	instead	of	blocks	and	context.	33	For	example	in	2013	the	US	Supreme	Court	in	the	Myriad	Genetics	case	ruled	that	naturally	occurring	genes	are	not	patentable	subject	material.	By	altering	patentability	as	a	tool	they	invalidated	all	the	related	gene	patents	(i.e.	blocks)	thus	weakening	the	businesses	that	the	patents	underpinned.	
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Figure 2.1 Patents as a hierarchy of norms (adapted from Petrusson, 2004) 
 
For example, when market actors ask courts to solve disputes, they concomitantly ask courts 
to define the rules and norms of the game. Thus when a court is asked to value a patent (i.e. a 
block), it will also define the rules and norms (i.e. the tools) that will define the value of all 
existing and future blocks. From a market perspective, this is a very risky business, especially 
when the tools are considered normatively open for discussion. Under these conditions, one 
case can easily set a precedent that impacts the entire market, which of course is why 
lobbying efforts are often intensified during periods of judicial and legislative ambiguity. 
Therefore, patents are a classic example of institutional facts, where the norms are constantly 
evolving. This means that while patents may be experienced positivistically, they are actually 
continuously being (re)interpreted through the lens of different public and private interests.34 
 
2.1.2 Patent Value as a Normative Claiming Game on Multiple Arenas 
 
The reification of institutional tools and blocks is a process of communication and acceptance, 
which can be described as a period of normative openness ending in normative closure, 
though never completely closed.35 During the period of openness, stakeholders make claims 
that are eventually either accepted (possibly in modified form) or rejected by the other 
stakeholders. However, communicative claims require institutional legitimacy (i.e. reified 
platforms where institutional tools are defined and accepted). Communicative claims can thus 
be seen as a game that takes place among different actors across different arenas. These 
different actors vie to have their claims of social reality accepted on these key arenas through 
various means of persuasion. 
 
Petrusson (2004) describes patents as a communicative game on three arenas, including the 
administrative, judicial, and business arenas as shown in figure 2.2 below. 
 
																																								 																				34	Positivism	is	a	scientific	approach	connected	with	the	investigation	of	an	objective	reality	such	as	in	natural	science.	In	social	science,	reality	is	not	ontologically	objective	but	can	be	experienced	as	such	through	reification.	35	Teubner	(2006)	explains,	“It	is	social	practices	in	the	world	of	business,	economy	and	politics	that	create	their	own	self-descriptions,	which	in	turn	inform	and	guide	the	underlying	social	practices”.	
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Figure 2.2 Three arenas model (Petrusson, 2004) 
 
The focus of the model is on the Business Arena, where firms use patents to engage in 
licensing or to build competitive market positions to sell products and services. Value creation 
on the business arena is supported by actions both on the Administrative Arena, where 
business actors negotiate the scope and validity of their patent claims with national patent 
offices and the Judicial Arena, where patents are ultimately validated when disputes arise. 
While the different arenas have their own logic, they are also part of an interrelated system of 
design, development, and validation that together defines the norms that determine the 
commercial value of patents. Using this model it is easy to see how different actors can play a 
communicative game on different arenas to try to enact their claims as a means to affect not 
only the validity of specific commercial building blocks but also the validity of the tools that 
are used to build them.  
 
 
2.2 The Changing Norms of Value Creation – From an Industrial to a 
Knowledge-Based Economic Paradigm36 
 
Economic development, particularly in developed countries, is said to be in the midst of a 
paradigmatic shift towards what has been ambiguously termed as post-industrial (Bell, 1976), 
service-based, information-based, network-based (Castells, 2009), creativity-based (Florida, 
2002), knowledge-based, and even post-capitalist (Drucker, 1990).37 Certainly, there is 
nothing new about the observation that knowledge plays a critical role in economic 
development. Economic institutions themselves are social constructions of knowledge. 
Products are physical manifestations of knowledge. Capabilities are specialized bundles of 
knowledge and so on. As a core contextual issue in this thesis relates to the heterogeneity of 
business models and the use of patents deployed by the market actors in the 
telecommunication value chain, this section seeks to provide a theoretical framework for 
understanding several key differences between industrial and knowledge-based business. In 
particular, this includes (1) the difference between a static to a dynamic use of intellectual 
property and (2) the relationship between a material versus the intellectual value chain. This 
																																								 																				36	Portions	of	Section	2.1	are	borrowed	from	Paper	3	in	the	dissertation.	37	Drucker	uses	post-capitalist	and	knowledge-based	society	interchangeably.	A	comparative	discussion	is	needed	but	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	For	now,	all	these	concepts	will	be	treated	as	synonymous.	
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sets the foundation for the understanding of the role that the changing norms of value creation 
play in the battle to define the meaning of FRAND.  
 
 
2.2.1  Knowledge-Based Business – From Static to Dynamic Use of Intellectual Property 
 
As mentioned above there is nothing new about the observation that knowledge plays a 
critical role in economic development.38 Since business cannot exist without knowledge, the 
existence of knowledge itself cannot be the defining characteristic of the knowledge economy 
in relation to an industrial economy, which was obviously also based on knowledge.  
 
“Fundamental to a knowledge-based theory of the firm is the assumption that the critical input 
in production and primary source of value is knowledge. Indeed, if we were to resurrect a 
single-factor theory of value in the tradition of the classical economists' labor theory of value 
or the French Physiocrats land-based theory of value, then the only defensible approach 
would be a knowledge-based theory of value, on the grounds that all human productivity is 
knowledge dependent, and machines are simply embodiments of knowledge.” (Grant, 1996, 
p.112) 
 
Thus central to defining the knowledge-based business is the need to understand how firms 
use knowledge in different ways to create value and achieve competitive advantage 
(Petrusson, 2004). Two important perspectives are related to the nature of firm resources, and 
how the value of these resources is appropriated through IP-based transactions. 
 
From a resource-based perspective, competitive advantage is typically defined in terms of the 
firm’s organizational control over key tangible and intangible resources (Penrose, 1959; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Over the past 40 years, there has been a significant shift in 
the proportion of tangible resources in relation to the market value of firms on the S&P 500 – 
from 83% in 1975 to 16% in 2015.39 This is a strong indication that intangible resources are 
now responsible for the majority of value creation across a broad range of US firms, 
supporting the premise that knowledge has replaced the traditional factors of production as the 
primary source of value.40 This, in turn, puts a greater emphasis on the management of 
knowledge to better understand the exact contribution the firm's intangible resources in 
relation to its value propositions. As the value of knowledge becomes increasingly recognized 
and objectified, the control of knowledge moves from an administrative to a key strategic 
																																								 																				38	The	term	knowledge	economy	is	not	perfect	in	this	regard	but	is	used	to	contrast	the	strong	reification	of	the	physical	product	as	the	center	of	economic	activity	in	the	industrial	economic	paradigm.	39	See	http://www.oceantomo.com/2015/03/04/2015-intangible-asset-market-value-study/.			40	However,	it	is	difficult	to	understand	exactly	what	is	meant	by	intangible	resources	as	the	measurement	is	only	a	calculated	residual.	In	other	words,	tangible	assets	are	calculated	from	the	balance	sheet	of	the	firms,	and	the	market	value	is	determined	by	the	stock	exchange,	but	the	value	of	intangible	assets	is	only	obtained	by	subtracting	these	two	values	(i.e.	there	is	no	accounting	or	direct	market	valuation	of	the	intangible	assets	of	firms).	Similar	to	the	calculation	of	Solow’s	residual	in	the	1950s,	the	revelation	that	the	S&P	500	is	mostly	intangible	capital	intensive	only	defines	the	extent	of	our	ignorance.	See	Solow	(1957).	
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process of the firm. In fact, one way to differentiate the industrial and knowledge economy is 
to say we are moving from the control of the means of production to the control of knowledge 
as the core driver of competitive advantage. 
 
From a transactional perspective, one defining aspect of the growth of knowledge-based 
business is that objectified knowledge (e.g. patented technology) is growing as an activity of 
market exchange. Thus the transformation from an industrial to a knowledge economy can 
also be characterized by a fundamental shift in the role of intellectual property from a static to 
a dynamic approach where intellectual property is used not only used to block others (i.e. 
static) but also as objects in commercial transactions (i.e. dynamic) (Merges, 1996). This 
impacts how knowledge is created, controlled, and commercialized, opening up for new 
knowledge-based business models and facilitating the development of a division of innovative 
labor (Merges, 1999). As the value of knowledge is contextual in nature, the means by which 
it is utilized through different business models and market norms will ultimately define its 
actual value-in-use (Petrusson and Heiden, 2009). Thus the value of knowledge is business 
model specific, where license-based models are increasingly used as a means of capturing this 
value in the knowledge economy. Below is an attempt to define knowledge-based business 
that incorporates both a resource and a transactional approach (i.e. input and output) 
independent of the dominant industrial logic.  
 
Knowledge-based business can be defined as commercial activity where proprietary 
knowledge is its main resource input and/or output characterized by the following: 
 
Value addition of knowledge 
The key value drivers are mainly determined by the knowledge component (i.e. objectified 
intellectual assets such as technology, brands, content, designs, know-how, etc.) of the value 
proposition.  When knowledge itself is the value proposition such as in an IP license, then this 
distinction is obvious. However, this is not as intuitive when the value proposition is delivered 
as a physical or virtual product.41 Branded products are a good example where the value 
addition of the brand is worth far more than the cost of production of the product itself. 
Another example would be the delivery of software on a DVD or a cure for a disease in the 
form of a pill. In these cases, the material value proposition is of much lesser value than the 
knowledge-based value proposition. The physical object is simply the carrier of the real 
knowledge-based value proposition (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).42 
 
Control of knowledge 
																																								 																				41	A	virtual	product	in	this	context	is	considered	a	value	proposition	that	is	delivered	completely	as	a	digital	product	or	service	(e.g.	a	software	application,	search	engine,	etc.).	42	Vargo	&	Lusch	argue	that	the	distinction	between	products	and	services	is	a	social	construction	based	on	a	historical	focus	on	operand	resources	such	as	land	and	physical	goods	as	opposed	to	the	underlying	operant	resources.	They	contend	that	all	economic	activity	is	service-based	–	a	fact	that	has	been	hidden	by	the	indirect	exchange	of	the	market	for	physical	goods	–	and	call	for	a	change	in	the	dominant	marketing	logic	from	a	focus	on	goods	to	service	provision	as	the	core	to	economic	exchange.	Here	service	is	defined	as	a	value	proposition	to	customers	instead	of	an	economic	activity	where	knowledge	is	the	key	operant	resource.	
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Maintaining control over the key intellectual assets of the value proposition is critical to 
creating competitive advantage.  Knowledge, once created, is neither a rival nor a scarce 
resource. The control of knowledge through various mechanisms including intellectual 
property rights is essential to the claiming of knowledge in property transactions as well as 
allowing for freedom to operate in knowledge-intensive industries. 
 
Business model specific 
Knowledge-based business (KBB) is business model specific, not sector specific (though 
some sectors use mainly KBB models, for example, IT, creative industries, etc.) Knowledge is 
important in all economic paradigms, but what differentiates knowledge-based business is the 
increasing role played by knowledge as discreet commercial objects in market transactions.   
 
The next section will elaborate on the transformation from an industrial to a knowledge-based 
business paradigm in relation to changes in the structure of the firm and industry value 
centered on an increased dynamic use of intellectual property. 
 
2.2.2  The Material vs. Intellectual Value Chain 
 
The industrial economy is typified by a relatively few, well-known commercial means from 
which to create and extract value through the production, distribution, sales, and repair of 
physical goods (Porter, 1985). Figure 2.3 below depicts the classic material value chain 
(MVC) where firms can occupy multiple stages in the chain (i.e. vertical integration) or 
occupy the same stage in multiple value chains (i.e. horizontal integration).  However, if 
proprietary knowledge is the key to competitive advantage in the knowledge economy, the 
traditional focus on the MVC will need to be supplemented with what could be termed as an 
intellectual value chain (IVC).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Generic Industry Value Chain (adapted from Porter, 1985) 
 
In figure 2.4, the intellectual value creation process makes explicit the source of value as the 
knowledge of human resources captured as intellectual assets and property, which can then be 
commercialized through different business models that in turn impacts the norms and 
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structure of the market. This includes the use of traditional physical products as the carrier of 
value in which case the traditional material value chain shapes the market. In addition, 
though, knowledge can be delivered through virtual products (e.g. information technology 
solutions such as software), as knowledge transfer through license agreement (e.g. 
patent/technology license), as a professional service (e.g. consulting), or a combination of all 
these mechanisms. These different means of knowledge exploitation involve the creation of 
completely different market norms and business models. For example, the packaging of music 
in an iTunes or Spotify solution creates quite different firm and market norms than the 
historical model of retailing music through CDs or records (i.e. physical products). In both 
business models, proprietary knowledge is the key underlying asset. The change from a 
physical product to a virtual product/service serves to unveil the true value creation object and 
expose the industrial paradigm as simply one mode of commercial distribution among others. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Intellectual Value Creation Process 
(Adapted from Petrusson, 2004; Petrusson and Heiden, 2008) 
 
The intellectual value creation process clarifies the creation and capture of valuable 
knowledge as the core resources (i.e. intellectual assets and property) of knowledge-based 
business in alignment with the resource-based view of the firm. It also focuses on the dynamic 
movement of knowledge from the minds of individuals to its explicit objectification and 
packaging as property through various commercial delivery mechanisms. Knowledge thus 
moves from being an abstract concept to objectified assets and property to be managed and 
transacted. The key activity of the firm, in turn, becomes the maximization of the value of 
knowledge through the development of innovations, markets, and ventures through the 
function of knowledge management as an integration of human resource management and 
intellectual asset/property management, differing greatly from the focus on the production and 
distribution of physical resources in the MVC (Petrusson, 2004). 
 
The transition from an MVC to IVC perspective can be exemplified using Porter's generic 
firm value chain shown below in figure 2.5. In this industrial model, the primary activities of 
the firm are related to the movement, development, and servicing of the physical product. 
Create 
Capture 
Commericialize 
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Technology development is considered a support activity, not a profit center activity of its 
own. However, once knowledge is put as the focal point for value creation and extraction, 
technology development could be seen as the primary activity of the firm whereby the MVC 
becomes only one of several commercial options available to the firm as shown in figure 2.2 
above.  This, in turn, creates opportunities for both outsourcing of MVC activities and 
specialization in technology development and innovation facilitating the development of a 
division of innovative labor.43 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Generic Firm Value Chain – (Porter, 1985) 
Author’s emphasis on technology development 
 
 
For this thesis the focus will be on the key operational differences between competition on a 
product market (i.e. a MVC) versus a technology market (i.e. an IVC), where the former is 
primarily concerned with the production and sale of physical products and the latter with the 
packaging of knowledge as intellectual property and commercialization through license-based 
transactions (Grindley and Teece, 1999; Arora et al., 2001). While the material value chain 
(MVC) can be seen as a component of a more holistic intellectual value creation process as 
depicted in figure 2.6, this thesis will define the two value chains as separate but 
complementary as a means to better illustrate the different commercial logics and strategies 
deployed by market actors. This is particularly relevant considering the changing role of IP 
licensing from being simply an alternative to in-house production to a primary means of 
generating revenue and facilitating access in standards-enabled markets with multi-technology 
products, where IP ownership is often distributed among many actors (Petrusson, 2004). 
 
 
																																								 																				43	The	lack	of	marginal	cost	of	knowledge	combined	with	the	market	power	created	through	its	control	(e.g.	through	a	patent)	allows	for	knowledge	to	operate	separately	from	its	embodiment	in	physical	products	and	capture	value	through	its	own	value	chain	(i.e.	the	IVC).	
Firm Infrastructure 
Human Resource Management 
Technology Development 
Procurement 
Inbound 
Logistics Operations 
Outbound 
Logistics 
Sales & 
Marketing Service 
M
argin  
M
ar
gi
n 
Primary Activities 
Support 
Activities 
	 18	
 
 
Figure 2.6 Commercialization of knowledge on both a material and intellectual value chain 
 
Figure 2.6 above depicts how knowledge can be commercialized through both a material and 
intellectual value chain as products, license offers, or both. In particular, this model highlights 
the specific path for the transaction of intellectual property in the IVC versus the transaction 
of physical property, with or without the associated intellectual property, in the MVC. As 
technology/patent licensing is often directed at producers of physical products, it is important 
to understand the intersection of the two value chains (i.e. the position in the material value 
chain where licensing takes place) as this is particularly relevant in the determination of how 
value is shared across market actors in the different value chains. 
 
 
2.3 SEPs, FRAND, and Open Standards in a Changing 
Telecommunication Value Chain44 
 
2.3.1 The Value of Standards 
 
The modern economy runs on standards (Blind, 2004; Blind and Jungmittag, 2008). In 
particular, the information and communication technology (ICT) sector that defines the 
information age is completely dependent on interoperability standards (West, 2005). One 
study identified 251 interoperability standards and estimated many more relevant standards in 
a laptop computer (Biddle, 2010). Another ubiquitous product, Microsoft's Windows 7 (a de 
facto standard itself) is conservatively estimated as employing at least 60 industry standards, 
though it is important to note that standards vary greatly in their complexity and strategic 
commercial use by market actors.45 Standards, in general, are basically codified knowledge in 
the form of technical specifications that define systems and interfaces between systems. IEEE 
defines standards as follows: 
 
Standards are published documents that establish specifications and procedures designed to 
maximize the reliability of the materials, products, methods, and/or services people use every 
day. Standards address a range of issues, including but not limited to various protocols to help 
																																								 																				44	Portions	of	Section	2.3	are	borrowed	from	Papers	2	and	3	in	the	dissertation.	45	See	Microsoft’s	submission	to	the	FTC	Patent	Standards	Workshop	(2011).	
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maximize product functionality and compatibility, facilitate interoperability and support 
consumer safety and public health.46 
 
ETSI cites similar benefits to standardization, such as interoperability, safety, and reliability, 
but also emphasizes business benefits, including increased market access and innovation as 
well as improved consumer choice.47 
 
In general, standards are viewed as pro-competitive.48 From an economic perspective, 
standards are public goods in that their use is fundamentally non-rival, which means that once 
developed they can be diffused at low cost and used by many actors simultaneously. This 
explains why standards facilitate knowledge spillover and diffusion, which is widely 
considered to increase economic efficiency and growth through both supply-side and demand-
side economies of scale.49 However, the development of standards experience the same 
general difficulties characteristic of knowledge (and information) production in that they are 
often expensive to create but inexpensive to distribute and therefore pose challenges with the 
appropriation of value, which is cited as a typical reason for underinvestment in R&D.50 Thus, 
while standards can facilitate the creation of efficient markets for downstream implementers 
of products and services, it doesn’t solve the appropriation and uncertainty challenges for 
upstream innovators that perform the R&D that defines the technical specifications of the 
standard. This issue will be addressed in the next section. 
 
2.3.2 The Tension Between Patents and Open Standards – FRAND as a Solution 
 
Open, consensus-based standards, have played an important role in the growth of the 
telecommunication sector.51 Open standardization processes can involve hundreds of actors 
and require access to thousands of patents that are essential to the implementation of a 
standard.52 The IEEE defines standard essential patents as follows: 
 
An Essential Patent Claim “shall mean any Patent Claim the practice of which was necessary 
to implement either a mandatory or optional portion of a normative clause of the IEEE 
Standard when, at the time of the IEEE Standard’s approval, there was no commercially and 
technically feasible non-infringing alternative implementation method for such mandatory or 
																																								 																				46	Retrieved	from	https://standards.ieee.org/develop/overview.html.		47	See	http://www.etsi.org/standards/why-we-need-standards.		
48	See	David	and	Steinmueller	(1994)	for	an	overview	of	the	pro-	and	anti-competitive	aspects	of	technical	compatibility	standards.	49	Demand-side	economies	of	scale	are	also	known	as	network	externalities,	which	is	a	well-established	benefit	of	interoperability.	See	Katz	and	Shapiro	(1985)	for	a	discussion	on	the	different	types	of	network	externalities.	50	See	Arrow	(1962)	for	a	discussion	on	the	problems	of	markets	to	efficiently	allocate	resources	for	invention	due	to	the	indivisibilities,	inappropriability,	and	uncertainty	associated	with	information	(knowledge)		51	See	Kretchmer	(2006)	for	a	typology	of	ten	requirements	that	enable	open	standards.	52	For	example,	the	MPEG-LA	patent	pool	for	the	ITU	H.264/AVC	standard	consists	of	approximately	30	licensors,	over	2400	essential	patents,	and	over	1200	licensees.	See	http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/AVC/Pages/Intro.aspx.	
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optional portion of the normative clause. An Essential Patent Claim does not include any 
Patent Claim that was essential only for Enabling Technology or any claim other than that set 
forth above even if contained in the same patent as the Essential Patent Claim”. 53 
 
The complex standardization processes are typically governed formally or by voluntary 
participation by specific standard-setting organizations (SSOs)54 run by industry consortiums, 
professional associations, and national or international NGOs.55 SSOs are solely focused on 
developing the best technical specifications and formally forbid issues concerning patents and 
licensing to take place within standard deliberations.56 However, as the creation of standards 
generate network effects that can lead to lock-in effects on the market, holders of patents 
essential to the execution of the standard could possess a much higher degree of market power 
than would normally be attributed to actors in a competitive market (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 
Farrell and Klemperer, 2003). An example of the early use of standard-essential patents 
(SEPs) and the subsequent policy developments will be discussed below. 
 
One key development in the creation of IPR policies in telecommunication standards can be 
traced back to the change in the role of patents that occurred during the development of the 
GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications, originally Groupe SpécialMobile) 
standard for mobile telephony. Using a relative advantage from a small portfolio of standard-
essential patents (SEPs) Motorola altered the structure of the nascent GSM market in the late 
1980s and early 1990s by forcing implementing firms to enter into licensing agreements in 
order to produce GSM standard-compliant equipment (Bekkers et al., 2002). The recognition 
of the potential power of SEPs generated a movement within European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), as well as other SSOs, to develop IPR policies to govern the role 
of patents in the development and commercialization of standards (Iversen, 1999). These 
efforts resulted in the widespread use of what is known as a FRAND agreement, where patent 
holders contractually agree to license their SEPs under Fair, Reasonable, And Non-
Discriminatory (FRAND) terms to members of the SSO and third parties (Lemley, 2002; 
Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012).57 Thus, FRAND has facilitated the transition from a static 
(i.e. blocking) to a dynamic (i.e. licensing) use of patents in the telecommunications value 
chain as discussed in section 2.1.58 In essence, FRAND provides a market-based governance 
structure to balance the complex interests of diverse actors in the value chain so as to both 
incentivize technology contributions and facilitate market diffusion of the standard. FRAND 
can, therefore, be seen as a mechanism to manage two competing theories of market failures – 
public goods dilemma and holdup, which will be discussed further in section 2.4. 
																																								 																				53	See	IEEE-SA	Standards	Board	Bylaws	(2016),	p.15	at	https://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf.	54	Examples	include	Bluetooth	(industry	consortium),	IEEE	(professional	association),	ANSI	(American	NGO),	and	ITU-T	(International	NGO).	55	Standards	can	also	be	developed	and	governed	by	individual	firms	(e.g.	Microsoft	Windows)	and	competing	standards	can	emerge	leading	to	standards	wars	–	see	Shapiro	and	Varian	(1999).	56	See,	for	example,	the	ITU/ISO/IEC	Common	Patent	Policy.		57	See	Contreras	(2015)	for	a	brief	history	of	FRAND	though	primarily	from	an	anti-trust	perspective.	58	For	example,	Motorola	in	GSM	was	easily	able	to	block	access	to	their	SEPs,	while	FRAND	by	definition	requires	access.	
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The IPR policies of SSOs typically encourage, as opposed to requiring, members to disclose 
patent and patent applications that are or may become essential to the standard in a timely 
manner. Once disclosed the patent holder is then asked to sign an agreement defining their 
intention to license their SEPs under FRAND terms (or royalty fee).59 If a declared owner of 
an SEP does not agree to license their patents under FRAND terms, it is usually required that 
a different non-infringing technical option is chosen for the standard.60 This agreement is the 
key to the fundamental quid pro quo social contract that rewards inventive efforts and unlocks 
the pro-competitive, value-creating potential of standardization. The specifics of a FRAND 
license are left for negotiation between market actors. In fact, SSOs have typically steered 
clear of specifying what constitutes a FRAND license.61 FRAND-enabled standards, such as 
802.11, 4G/LTE, H.264, etc. have experienced great adoption and market success. 
 
2.4 Patent Holdup, Holdout, and Economic Efficiency 
 
2.4.1 The Rise of Patent Holdup Theory – Does it Apply to Standards? 
 
Farrell et al. (2007) define holdup as follows:  
 
”In very broad terms, opportunism or hold-up arises when a gap between economic 
commitments and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party to capture part of the 
fruits of another’s investment, broadly construed. Hold-up can arise, in particular, when one 
party makes investments specific to a relationship before all the terms and conditions of the 
relationship are agreed. Hold-up generally leads to economic inefficiency that contracting 
parties, and courts interpreting contracts, often try to avoid.” 
  
The concepts of opportunism and holdup have their origin in the study of transaction cost 
economics associated with contracting versus vertical integration (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 
1975; Teece, 1976). Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) describe opportunism (and holdup) 
as a case of appropriable quasi-rents to contracted specific assets, where opportunism can take 
place in either direction (i.e. the buyer or the seller). The concept of opportunism not only 
raises transactional issues of rent-shifting of producer surplus among market actors, but also 
systemic issues of economic inefficiency that raise antitrust concerns. 
 
																																								 																				59	Patent	holders	can	also	issue	a	Blanket	Letter	of	Assurance	”that	applies	to	all	Essential	Patent	Claims	for	which	a	Submitter	may	currently	or	in	the	future	have	the	ability	to	license.”	(source:	IEEE-SA	Standards	Board	By-laws)	60	See	ITU/ISO/IEC	Joint	Patent	Policy	61	The	exception	is	the	recent	controversial	changes	by	the	IEEE	to	an	IPR	policy	that	more	clearly	define	FRAND	terms	has	been	met	by	resistance	from	key	telecommunication	firms	with	strong	SEP	portfolios.	
	 22	
The development of biotechnology, telecommunications, and computing in the 1990s gave 
rise to discussions on the tragedy of the anti-commons62 and patent thickets,63 questioning 
whether patents were, in fact, deterring instead of facilitating innovation (Heller, 1998; Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In the 21st century, increased patenting in general and 
litigation by patent-assertion entities (PAEs) against firms with multi-technology products led 
to the refined development of a new concept, patent holdup theory (Shapiro, 2001; Lemley 
and Shapiro, 2007; Farrell et al., 2007; Shapiro, 2010). Proponents of patent holdup theory 
claim that patent owners are able to command royalties greater than the value of the 
contribution of their patents for the following interrelated reasons (Lemley and Shapiro, 
2007): 
 
1. Holders of minor/weak patents can claim a portion of the value of the entire product 
by threatening injunctive relief through the lost product sales on the market.64 
2. Patent claims by multiple actors create a royalty stacking problem where each patent 
holder is able to negotiate a greater share than what would have been possible if the 
patents were held by one actor.65  
3. Courts consistently grant excessive damage awards that surpass the reasonable royalty 
rate because they are not able to correctly apportion the value of the patented 
invention related to the value of the product for products consisting of many patented 
inventions (i.e. multi-component products).66  
 
Lemley and Shapiro (2007) also extend their patent holdup theory beyond its primary focus 
on PAEs to the context of standards and SEPs. They argue that each of the problems of patent 
																																								 																				62	The	tragedy	of	the	anti-commons	is	a	concept	used	to	describe	the	circumstance	whereby	overlapping	property	rights	among	market	actors	effectively	block	the	action	of	all	actors	thus	severely	reducing	innovation	and/or	market	formation	(Heller,	1998;	Heller	and	Eisenberg,	1998).	This	is	in	contrast	to	the	classical	discussion	on	the	tragedy	of	the	commons	whereby	common-pool	resources	are	theorized	to	be	depleted	through	collective	action	(Hardin,	1968).	One	explanation	for	a	lack	of	"tragedy"	in	relation	to	systems	characterized	by	a	theoretical	anti-commons	problem,	could	be	attributed	to	the	ability	of	actors	to	self-regulate	their	behavior	as	was	observed	in	relation	to	common-pool	resources	(Ostrom,	1990).		63	Shapiro	(2001)	describes	patent	thickets	as	“a	dense	web	of	overlapping	intellectual	property	rights	that	a	company	must	hack	its	way	through	in	order	to	actually	commercialize	new	technology.”	64	Injunctive	relief	in	the	context	of	patents	refers	to	the	right	of	patent	owners	to	receive	a	court	order	blocking	the	sale	of	infringing	products.	The	dispute	between	NTP	and	RIM	is	often	cited	as	an	anecdotal	case	of	patent	holdup	through	the	threat	of	injunctive	relief,	whereby	RIM	agreed	to	pay	612.5	MUSD	to	avoid	be	enjoined,	while	the	actual	patent	damages	levied	by	the	court	only	amounted	to	33MUSD	(raised	to	55MUSD	by	the	judge	based	on	willfulness).	However,	while	this	case	may	demonstrate	the	effect	of	patent	holdup,	it	has	been	questioned	whether	RIM	was	the	victim	given	the	entire	history	of	the	case	–	for	example,	see	Blaxill	and	Eckardt	(2009).	65	Royalty	stacking	in	the	context	of	patents	refers	to	the	aggregate	royalty	paid	by	product	implementers	to	all	patent	owners	from	whom	a	license	is	required.	This	is	a	version	of	Cournot	complements	problem	of	multiple	monopoly	input	owners	(Cournot,	1897).	For	example,	Bekkers	and	West	(2009)	estimate	that	the	UMTS	telecommunication	standard	(aka	3G)	includes	1227	distinct	essential	patents	(i.e.	patent	families)	by	72	organizations	with	an	aggregate	royalty	rate	of	approximately	20%	of	the	price	of	a	mobile	phone.	66	Apportionment	of	patent	damages	has	been	historically	difficult	to	implement	in	practice	for	the	US	court	system	–	see	Benson	(2005).	A	number	of	recent	Federal	Circuit	decisions	have	taken	up	this	contentious	issue	in	regards	to	multi-technology	products,	including	Lucent	Technologies	v.	Gateway,	580	F.3d	1301	(Fed.	Cir.	2009),	Ericsson,	Inc.	v.	D-Link	Sys.,	Inc.,	773	F.3d	1201,	1226	(Fed.	Cir.	2014),	and	
CSIRO	v.	Cisco	Systems,	Inc.,	809	F.3d	1295,	1302	(Fed.	Cir.	2015).	
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holdup hypothesized above is theoretically exacerbated in the case of standardization as 
implementers of the standard are locked-in to a set of technical specifications and must 
license the required essential patents (i.e. there is little opportunity to invent around or switch 
to another solution).67  
 
Currently there is no conclusive empirical evidence of systemic patent holdup in any industry 
where standard-essential patents are offered for license under FRAND terms (Layne-Farrar, 
2014; Galetovic, Haber and Levine, 2015; Galetovic, Haber and Zaretzki (2016); Galetovic 
and Gupta, 2016; Mallinson, 2016; Sidak, 2016)68,69. For example, the H.264 and 802.11 
standards in question in the studied cases in Lemley and Shapiro (2007) have been extremely 
successful on the market, even though both standards contain thousands of SEPs and as many 
as 90 SEP holders. One explanation for this is that patent holdup is not based on ex post 
opportunism, but based on an ex ante FRAND agreement acknowledged and accepted by 
downstream companies before irreversible investments are made (Sidak, 2013).  
 
While transactional patent holdup and holdout can take place at any time amongst parties to a 
FRAND commitment due to the incomplete nature of the contract, the market success of ICT 
standards suggests that both upstream and downstream actors are incentivized to negotiate in 
good faith for their own mutual benefit (Layne-Farrar and Wong-Ervin, 2015). This is 
possibly another explanation for the lack of empirical evidence of market failure in FRAND-
enabled standards. However, despite the prolific use of FRAND policies by the majority of 
SSOs (Lemley, 2002; Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012) and the reduction in access to injunctive 
relief by patent owners (eBay v. MercExchange), there has persisted a growing concern 
regarding a lack of market consensus on the meaning of FRAND and that SEPs produce a 
systemic level of opportunism or holdup by SEP holders in the market that warrants policy 
remedies.70  
																																								 																				67	The	FTC	in	its	complaint	against	Google	defined	patent	holdup	in	the	context	of	standardization	to	be	“the	increase	in	the	value	of	the	patent	based	on	the	switching	costs	after	it	becomes	a	SEP	is	known	as	its	‘hold-up’	value.”	68	See	also	Reply	Submission	on	the	Public	Interest	of	Federal	Trade	Commissioners	Maureen	K.	Ohlhausen	and	Joshua	D.	Wright,	In	the	Matter	of	–	Certain	3G	Mobile	Handsets	and	Components	Thereof,	International	Trade	Commission	(Inv.	No.	337-TA-613,	2015),	Section	2	entitled	,	“Empirical	Evidence	Suggest	no	Systemic	Problem	With	Holdup.”	See	Wright	and	Ginsburg	(2014)	for	a	discussion	on	contractual	opportunism	and	antitrust	implications.	See	Balkenborg,	Kaplan,	and	Miller	(2012)	differentiating	holdup	situations	that	merely	redistribute	income	(i.e.	transactional)	from	those	that	block	investment	and	create	inefficiencies	(i.e.	systemic).	The	concepts	of	ex	post	vs.	ex	ante	opportunism	is	another	way	to	view	the	difference	between	transactional	and	systemic	holdup,	where	the	latter	has	a	much	greater	impact	on	investment	and	market	formation.	69	For	example,	neither	the	2014	EC	report	on	Patents	and	Standards	or	the	2013	National	Academy	of	Science	report	on	Patent	Challenges	for	Standard-Setting	in	the	Global	Economy	–	Lessons	from	Information	and	Communication	Technology	does	not	mention	empirical	evidence	of	systemic	problem	related	to	patent	hold-up	beyond	an	increase	FRAND-related	court	cases.	However,	the	NAS	report	specifically	states	the	committee	found	“no	empirical	evidence	showing	that	royalty	stacking	currently	suppresses	the	adoption	or	use	of	standard-compliant	products.”	70	For	example	see	Comment	of	Cisco	Systems	Inc.	(for	Cisco,	HP,	IBM,	and	RIM),	Federal	Trade	Commission	Request	for	Comments	and	Announcement	of	Workshop	on	Standard-Setting	Issues	(Patent	Standards	Workshop,	Project	No.P-11-1204).	See	Prepared	Statement	for	the	Record	of	Intel	Corporation	for	the	Senate	Committee	on	the	Judiciary	Subcommittee	on	Antitrust,	Competition	Policy	and	Consumer	
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Numerous remedies have been put forward as potential solutions to the theoretical problem of 
patent holdup. Lemley (2007) advanced ten suggestions, including limiting injunction relief in 
multi-technology products, ex ante disclosure and negotiation of FRAND royalties within 
SSOs and the concomitant loosening of anti-trust regulations that would entail, and patent 
reform focused on redefining reasonable royalty rates in damage calculations. More recently 
additional solutions have been put forward such as non-assertion after a specified time 
(Rysman and Simcoe, 2011), a pseudo patent pool approach (Contreras, 2013), “baseball-
style” arbitration (Lemley and Shapiro, 2013), a “contingent ex ante” valuation framework 
(Siebrasse and Cotter, 2015),a return to a traditional incremental value model applicable to 
both SEPs and non-SEPs alike (Contreras and Gilbert, 2015), and a “structured price 
commitments” approach (Lerner and Tirole, 2015). While all of these solutions have a 
theoretical possibility to reduce patent holdup and increase static economic efficiency, they 
also have a theoretical possibility reduce dynamic efficiency potentially resulting in an overall 
reduction in aggregate social welfare.  
 
Concomitantly, numerous scholars have questioned both the transactional and efficiency 
impact of patent holdup and royalty stacking, challenging its existence and operationalization 
by the scholars, courts, and regulatory actors (e.g. Galetovic and Haber, 2017; Layne-Farrar 
and Wong-Ervin, 2015; Sidak, 2013; Gupta, 2013; Dorsey and McGuire, 2012; Epstein, 
Kieff, and Spulber, 2012; Denicolo et al., 2008; Elhauge, 2008; Sidak, 2009, and Geradin and 
Rato, 2007; Golden (2007) among others).71 In particular, the cooperative, repeated game 
nature of standard-setting is cited as a specific check on the effectiveness of opportunistic 
behavior in the long-run as well as a deterrent among invested actors in the short-run.72 The 
open question in the debate over patent holdup theory is not whether patent holdup is 
theoretically possible, but whether it is practically relevant in the case of open standards 
operating under FRAND IPR policies and reduced access to injunctive relief. An extensive 
critique of patent holdup theory is provided in paper 4.  
 
2.4.2 Patent Holdout Theory – The Forgotten Side of the Coin 
 
FRAND-enabled technology standards are built on voluntary technical contributions that once 
finalized are made openly available. Thus technology standardization is a process of 
technology transfer where FRAND licenses are typically negotiated after products have 
already been put on the market. This process creates the potential for opportunism by both 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													Rights	on	Standard	Essential	Patent	Disputes	and	Antitrust	Law	(2013).	See	US	Federal	Trade	Commission	Google	Consent	Degree	(2013).	71	See	also	Reply	Submission	on	the	Public	Interest	of	Federal	Trade	Commissioners	Maureen	K.	Ohlhausen	and	Joshua	D.	Wright,	In	the	Matter	of	–	Certain	3G	Mobile	Handsets	and	Components	Thereof,	International	Trade	Commission	(Inv.	No.	337-TA-613,	2015),	Section	2	entitled,	“Empirical	Evidence	Suggest	no	Systemic	Problem	With	Holdup.”	72	A	repeated	game	means	that	the	activity	will	take	place	again	in	the	future	whereby	the	actors	involved	are	able	to	take	into	account	the	behavior	in	the	previous	instance.	Compare	with	Ostrom	(1990)	on	the	dangers	of	classifying	collective-action	problems	as	prisoner	dilemma	games.		
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parties, where SEP holders could leverage their power position through higher than 
reasonable royalty rates (i.e. patent holdup) and implementing firms can evade and delay 
payment of royalties while marketing products that include technology developed and owned 
by others. This latter concept has been termed reverse patent holdup or patent holdout (Chien, 
2014; Geradin, 2010). 
 
If one sees patent holdup and holdout as a continuum, the key, determining factor is the 
accessibility of injunctive relief to patent owners. This is often discussed in the context of 
property vs. liability rules, where the lack of injunctive relief can effectively reduce a patent 
owner's rights to one of mere compensation for infringement (Calabresi and Melamed, 1972). 
In this regard, the use of FRAND agreements in open standards can be seen as a way for 
market actors to contract into liability rules without altering the fundamental property rules 
for patents (Merges, 1996). Recently, however, the property rules for SEPs have been 
weakened through the US Supreme Court ruling in eBay that effectively eliminates 
injunctions in cases involving multi-technology products and the Federal Trade Commission 
Google decree that places prohibitions on SEP holders to see injunctive relief on antitrust 
grounds.73 While regulations to reduce access in injunctive relief can lower the possibility of 
patent holdup, it can also increase the possibility of patent holdout. Thus, in the current 
regulatory environment, patent holdout theory becomes increasingly important to 
investigate.74 
 
To date, patent holdout theory has received much less attention by scholars, courts, regulators, 
and policymakers (Geradin, 2010).75 This is unusual given the weakening ability of patent 
owners in general and SEP owners, in particular, to obtain injunctive relief over the past 
decade (Chien, 2014).76 To further confuse the situation, there exists a theoretical problem 
with the use of the term "holdout" as it has an existing theoretical connotation in mainstream 
economics related to the situation where coordination between economic agents does not 
occur because one agent withholds consent (Epstein, 1993; Libecap, 1993; Miceli, 2011). We 
are thus confronted with the dilemma that neither patent holdup nor patent holdout is 
consistent with the historical use of "holdup" and "holdout" in mainstream economic theory 
but instead used as pseudo-scientific labels in the rhetorical battle to define the meaning of 
FRAND.77  
 
Semantics aside, implementing firms, which have already received the standard 
specifications, can simply choose not to accept an offer from an SEP licensor in the absence 
																																								 																				73	See	eBay	Inc.	v.	MercExchange,	L.L.C.,	547	U.S.	388	(2006),	and	In	the	matter	of	Google,	Inc.,	a	corporation,	File	No.	102	3136,	(2011).	74	The	CJEU	ruling	in	Huawei	v.	ZTE	sought	to	balance	the	interests	of	SEP	owners	and	implementers	by	defining	the	conditions	under	which	a	SEP	owner	can	seek	injunctive	relief	against	an	”unwilling”	licensee.		75	A	recent	exception	in	the	European	context	is	the	EU	Court	of	Justice	opinion	in	Huawei	v.	ZTE	where	the	court	held	that	an	injunction	was	possible	in	relation	to	an	”unwilling	licensee”.	76	eBay	Inc	v.	MercExchange,	L.L.C.,	547	U.S.	388	(2006)	significantly	weakened	the	ability	of	patent	owners	to	obtain	injunctive	relief	particularly	with	regard	to	multi-component	products.	Additionally,	the	ability	of	SEP	holders	to	petition	for	injunctive	relief	was	restricted	through	the	US	Federal	Trade	Commission	Google	Consent	Degree	in	2013.	77	A	thorough	treatment	of	this	semantic,	theoretical	issue	is	provided	in	Paper	4.	
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of the threat of injunctive relief. Thus while injunctive relief can theoretically facilitate patent 
holdup, lack of injunctive relief could facilitate patent holdout, which could lead to a 
systematic delay and non-payment of FRAND royalties to SEP holders. The increase in recent 
SEP litigation with appeals rising to the CAFC is indicative of the difficulty to achieve 
agreement on FRAND terms through bilateral market negotiations.78 
 
Recent evidence of aggregate royalties in standards-enabled products (i.e. the royalty stack) 
raises questions about whether SEP holders are actually under-compensated for their 
technology contributions (Galetovic, Haber and Levine, 2015; Galetovic, Haber and Zaretzki 
(2016); Galetovic and Gupta, 2016; Mallinson, 2016; Sidak, 2016). While patent holdup has 
been addressed by global competition authorities (i.e. DOJ/FTC, DG Comp), it is less obvious 
whether patent holdout (i.e. freeriding, trespass, or abuse of non-patent position) is considered 
an antitrust issue, which raises questions regarding policy remedies if it should be shown that 
patent holdout has a systemic impact on economic efficiency, in particular, dynamic 
efficiency. An extensive review and development of patent holdout theory are provided in 
paper 4. 
 
 
2.5 Conceptualization of the Meaning of FRAND 
 
FRAND is an example of a purposefully incomplete contract negotiated by sophisticated 
actors to provide a framework for private ordering in the public interest (Wright, 2013).79 
While incomplete contracts may be considered efficient and desirable, the intrinsic ambiguous 
nature of reasonable and non-discriminatory makes FRAND susceptible to (re)interpretation 
and regulatory capture as changes in their meaning can have a large financial impact. Figure 
2.7 below maps the key constitutive concepts of FRAND that have been the focus of 
contention among stakeholders in the telecommunication value chain.80  
 
																																								 																				78	For	example	see	Ericsson	v.	D-Link,	773	F.3d	1201,	1227	(Fed.	Cir.	2014)	and	CSIRO	v.	Cisco	Systems,	Inc.,	809	F.3d	1295,	1302	(Fed.	Cir.	2015).	79	From	a	transaction	cost	perspective,	contracts	can	be	argued	to	be	necessarily	incomplete	because	of	the	costs	of	identifying	all	possible	contingencies.		80	Other	FRAND	issues	exist	such	as	3rd	party	rights	and	transference	of	FRAND	commitments	through	a	greater	consensus	and	less	contention	exists	in	these	areas.	
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Figure 2.7 Key constituent concepts defining the meaning of FRAND 
 
Multiple efforts to define these key concepts on the tool level through legal, economic and 
business argumentation have been put forward due to the possibility to enact a systemic 
effect. Below is a short description of each concept:81 
 
Patent Hold-up/out 
Patent hold-up/out is the core concept at the epicenter of the FRAND debate as introduced in 
section 2.4. It arises from the interaction of the exclusivity of patents and the lock-in of 
standards in combination with the heterogeneity of business models discussed in section 2.2. 
The term “holdup” has a specific negative connotation in transaction cost economics based on 
the exploitation of opportunism.82 Its contemporary meaning of holdup/out in the context of 
patents is typically understood as the opportunity of one party to expropriate value from 
another party through the following: 
 
• SEP holders charging excessive FRAND royalties to implementing firms (i.e. supra-
FRAND rates) that capture the non-SEP related investments 
• Implementing firms delaying or refusing to pay FRAND royalties to SEP holders (i.e. 
sub-FRAND rates) that capture SEP-related R&D investments 
 
The impact of patent hold-up/out can be deemed as having both distributional and welfare 
effects where the former is related to rent-shifting and the latter with economic efficiency and 
the need for potential policy remedies.  
 
Aggregate Royalty  
The issue of aggregate royalty is not an issue of the sheer number of SEPs but of the 
distributed ownership of SEPs among numerous owners.  Patent hold-up/out is deemed to 
occur through the following:  
																																								 																				81	Papers	1-4	provide	a	greater	theoretical	elaboration	on	these	different	concepts.	82	Galetovic	and	Haber	(2016)	have	questioned	the	theoretical	link	between	patent	holdup	and	the	concept	of	holdup	in	transaction	cost	economics.	
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• Royalty stack – when multiple SEP holders charge supra-FRAND rates to 
implementing firms 
• Royalty gap – when SEP holders receive sub-FRAND rates from multiple 
implementing firms 
 
The royalty stack/gap is a systematic issue as the result of a widespread over/underpayment of 
FRAND royalties by implementing firms deploying standard-enabled products and services. 
Preliminary empirical evidence shows the lack of evidence for a systematic royalty-stacking 
problem in relation to mobile telecommunication standards (Galetovic, Haber and Levine, 
2015; Galetovic, Haber and Zaretzki (2016); Galetovic and Gupta, 2016; Mallinson, 2016; 
Sidak, 2016). 
 
Ex Ante Valuation 
The concept of ex ante valuation is related to the time period in which courts should base their 
determination of patent damages in the context of FRAND royalties (Teece and Sherry, 2016; 
Lee and Melamed, 2015; Sidak, 2013).83 The tradition use of Georgia-Pacific factor 15 sets 
the timing at the point before the infringement took place. However, the following competing 
two FRAND-based valuation timeframes have been posited: 
 
• SSO timeframe – this theory states that the value of SEPs needs to be discounted in 
relation to their marginal benefit over the comparable technologies under 
consideration by the SSOs (Swanson and Baumol, 2005). 
• R&D timeframe – this theory states that the SSO timeframe is not ex ante enough and 
should be placed at the time of the R&D decision of the contributing firm (Sidak, 
2013). 
 
Despite the fact that Teece and Sherry (2003) describe that the practical, counterfactual 
determination of what the standard would look like if another technology had been adopted is 
difficult to determine ex post, the SSO timeframe model as been applied to two US court 
decisions on FRAND royalties.84 
 
Injunctive Relief 
Injunctive relief in the context of FRAND is associated with the blocking of import and sale 
of infringed products and services. As patent hold-up/out requires the compulsion to accept 
supra/sub-FRAND rates (i.e. an act cannot be opportunistic if there is no compulsion to accept 
the act), the exclusivity provided by injunctive relief is a core legal tool in the debate through 
the following theories: 
																																								 																				
83	Teece	and	Sherry	(2016)	state	the	recent	inclusion	of	ex	ante	valuation	of	SEPs	in	the	new	IEEE	IPR	policy	“essentially	amounts	to	the	proposition	that	all	of	the	gains	from	standardization	should	flow	to	implementers	and/or	consumers,	and	none	(except	via	the	volume	effect)	to	patent	holders	whose	technology	is	incorporated	into	the	standard”	84	See	Microsoft	Corp.	v.	Motorola,	Inc.,	No.	10-cv-1823	(W.D.	Wash.)	and	In	re	Innovatio	IP	Ventures	LLC,	No.	11-cv-09308	(N.D.	Illinois).	
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• Patent Holdup – by threatening the removal of the entire product or service from the 
market, injunctive relief provides the SEP holder an asymmetric bargaining position 
that can potentially produce a systematic impact on implementing firms and a 
systemic impact on social welfare (primarily static efficiency). 
• Patent Holdout – by removing the threat of injunctive relief, implementing firms have 
no incentive to make FRAND payments, providing SEP implementers an asymmetric 
bargaining position that can potentially produce a systematic impact on SEP holders 
and a systemic impact on social welfare (primarily dynamic efficiency). 
 
The potential impact of injunctive relief in regard to patent holdup theory has been seen as an 
issue of importance for competition authorities while the potential impact of patent holdout 
has not been seen as an antitrust issue even though it can affect competition and economic 
efficiency.85 
 
Royalty Base 
A FRAND royalty is determined by the combination of the royalty rate and the royalty base 
applied to the infringing product (or service). Competing theories of the location of the 
royalty base in the value chain are as follows: 
 
• Component level – proponents claim that smallest-saleable patent-practicing unit 
(SSPPU) should be used as the royalty base for FRAND determinations. 
• Product level – proponents claim that the product price paid by the consumer 
represents the proper royalty base for FRAND determinations 
 
The difference between calculating FRAND royalties using the component versus the product 
level is between 1-2 orders of magnitude depending on the product and standard, which has 
created very different results, based on divergent economic theories of SEP damages (Petit, 
2016; Putnam, 2016; Sherry and Teece, 2016; Contreras, 2015) 
 
Table 2.1 below shows the main areas of contention in relation to a patent holdup versus 
holdout logic and their comparative, underlying theoretical arguments. 
 
 Patent Holdup Patent Holdout 
Aggregate 
Royalty 
Multiple, independent claims 
produces a royalty stack 
Multiple, under/non-payment 
produces a royalty gap 
Ex Ante 
Valuation 
SSO timeframe allows for 
comparison of competing 
technology contributions 
R&D timeframe allows for 
comparison of competing 
technology investments 
Injunctive Relief Availability of injunction 
facilitates capture of supra-
Unavailability of injunction 
facilitates delay leading to sub-
																																								 																				85	See	for	example	the	US	FTC	Google	Consent	Order	(2013)	and	the	US	DOJ	IEEE	Business	Review	Letter	(2015).	
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FRAND royalties FRAND royalties 
Royalty Base Product level royalty base 
leads to over compensation of 
SEPs compared to SSPPU 
Component level royalty base 
leads to under compensation of 
SEPs compared to market value 
 
Table 2.1 FRAND conceptual areas of contention 
 
 
2.6 The Research Problem 
 
The overarching research problem addressed in this thesis is the need for an improved 
theoretical understanding of the changing nature of value creation from an industrial to a 
knowledge-based economic paradigm. This could also be described as the need for an 
improved knowledge-based theory of value at the level of the firm and the market – both the 
technology and product market. In the chosen context of this thesis, this translates more 
specifically to the challenge of understanding how patents should be governed in the 
development and commercialization of telecommunication standards to maximize social 
welfare. This involves the complex dynamics of patent and competition law issues from a 
public policy perspective with the patent and competitive strategy issues from the corporate 
strategy perspective, where the latter seeks to maximize economic performance and the 
former, economic efficiency – both static and dynamic efficiency.86 Furthermore, the type of 
standardization process under study is based on an emerging form of standard-setting 
organization (SSO), built on open, consensus among collaborators and competitors, operating 
as an open innovation platform in-between the traditional hierarchy of the firm and the arms-
length transaction of the market. Finally, the actors participating in the SSO are not 
homogenous in their participation and commercial interests, which generates competition on 
both a technology market to control the standard in addition to the more tradition product 
market that employs the standard. This interaction of management, economics, law, and 
technology in both theory and practice makes for a problematic terrain for policy-makers, 
judges, regulators, and business leaders to navigate. 
 
Based on the above research problem and societal challenge, this thesis seeks to answer the 
following main research question and sub-questions: 
 
How do competing interests seek to define the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of 
standard-essential patents (SEPs)? 
 
																																								 																				86	Static	efficiency	refers	to	the	maximization	of	social	welfare	through	the	Pareto	efficient	allocation	of	finite	resources	at	a	given	time,	while	dynamic	efficiency	focuses	on	the	generation	of	greater	social	welfare	through	expanding	societal	resources	(i.e.	to	shift	the	production	possibilities	frontier	to	the	right	through,	for	example,	innovation	and	entrepreneurship).	See	de	Soto	(2006)	for	a	thorough	discussion	of	the	differences	between	static	and	dynamic	efficiency.		
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• What are the current areas of contention regarding FRAND and the value of SEPs and 
how does this relate to the interests of actors on the telecommunication value chain? 
• What are the key theoretical concepts currently used to define the meaning of FRAND 
and how do they impact the value of SEPs? 
• How is the meaning of FRAND shaped by actors through key legitimizing arenas, 
such as the US court system? 
 
Specific research problems and questions have been postulated and addressed in each for the 
four appended papers.  
 
 
  
	 32	
3. Methodology 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to better understand how competing interests seek to define 
the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of SEPs. In particular, the focus is on the role 
of standard-essential patents and FRAND agreements within the open development and 
commercialization of telecommunication standards and their impact on economic 
performance and efficiency. This in turn raises the societal challenge of how patents should be 
governed in the development and commercialization of telecommunication standards to 
maximize social welfare To address this purpose requires an interdisciplinary, mixed method 
approach that is further discussed in the sections below. 
 
3.1  Rationale of Research Strategy and Design  
 
As the epistemological and ontological orientation of the researcher has a major impact on the 
choice of methodology, it is important to define this from the beginning (Cunliffe, 2010). This 
thesis takes the perspective that social reality is a dialectical phenomenon that is both 
normatively closed and cognitively open (Luhmann, 1992; Petrusson, 2004), allowing for 
social phenomena to be described statically as reified institutions and norms and dynamically 
as constructs designed and re-designed by subjective social action (Searle, 1995). 
Ontologically, this is fundamentally a social constructionist view, but one that allows for 
social phenomena to be investigated on two levels – (1) on the surface as an unconscious, 
reified construction (i.e. approaching objectivism) and (2) beneath the surface as a conscious 
struggle for power and control among various actors.87 It is through the process of reification 
that social constructions are experienced as phenomena that exist independently and separate 
from social action (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This, however, doesn’t mean that social 
phenomena are actually objective in the ontological sense – only that they have reached a 
state of normative closure within the given societal paradigm.88 Therefore it is the role of the 
social scientist to understand the reification process and not to only describe phenomena but 
to deconstruct the interests and communicative actions that define the reality of phenomena as 
institutional facts.89 
 
The phenomena of intellectual property and standards are two institutional mechanisms 
designed to generate wealth and welfare in society. Both mechanisms were developed within 
an industrial logic and are now facing new challenges (both regulatory and market) when 
applied within business settings that are becoming increasingly knowledge-based. The case of 
telecommunications offers a unique look into how the institutions of intellectual property and 
																																								 																				87	This	perspective	is	similar	to	the	argument	for	intersubjectivity	by	Cunliffe	(2010)	in	her	proposed	revision	of	the	typology	from	Morgan	and	Smircich	(1980).	However,	Petrusson	(2004)	proposes	that	social	phenomena	need	to	be	understood	through	a	dynamic	alternation	between	normative	closure	(objectivity)	and	cognitive	openness	(subjectivity)	instead	of	suggesting	an	additional	third	static	state	(intersubjectivity).	88	Searle	(1995)	uses	the	term	“institutional	facts,”	in	contrast	to	“brute	facts,”	as	they	require	human	institutions	for	their	existence.	89	This	is	comparable	to	what	Aastrup	and	Halldorsson	(2008)	describe	as	”causal	depth”.	
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standards are evolving social constructions caught in the shift of economic paradigms at the 
interface of strong political and business interests. To investigate these phenomena in 
transformation it is critical to not only describe the surface level where self-interests are 
marketed as facts but to delve below the surface and deconstruct the conflicting interests of 
business and society so as to allow for a transparent, evidence-based dialogue to drive the 
reconstruction of these important social structures.  
 
To investigate this transformation process using a dialectic epistemological view requires a 
research strategy with a mixed method approach – relying on theoretical frameworks from 
different disciplines and strong empirical evidence derived through primarily qualitative 
methods but also supported when possible by quantitative data when it serves an explanatory 
purpose. For example, SEPs can by investigated objectively by counting the number of 
declared SEPs and SEP holders in a particular standard, while the meaning of FRAND and its 
impact on SEP value requires a qualitative investigation of the political and economic 
influence of the stakeholders within the commercial and regulatory eco-system. In other 
words, the meaning of FRAND can be understood as both normatively closed, reified 
phenomena as well as a cognitively open subjective communicative actions of the relevant 
stakeholders. The normative space between these two epistemic perspectives in turns allows 
for the critical investigation of how different subjective concepts and arguments are 
communicated and accepted in different arenas and the subsequent analysis of the potential 
impact on firms and society of these beliefs. Thus, a dialectic epistemological approach 
creates the opportunity to study the reification process of FRAND and SEP value, which is 
necessary to address the research problem and achieve the research purpose of the thesis. 
 
The research design consists of a hierarchical study in two phases. The first phase primarily 
deploys an exploratory, multiple case study design to develop a broad understanding of the 
key concepts and areas of contention that are being used by competing stakeholders to define 
the meaning of FRAND and SEP value. The second phase deploys a more comparative/cross-
sectional design to specifically compare and contrast key FRAND concepts across different 
economic paradigms and business models as well as a deeper comparative review of 
economic theory and case law. This required both deductive and inductive methods, 
systematically combining empirical insights with different theoretical foundations in an 
abductive, integrative and evolutionary process (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994; Dubois and 
Gadde, 2002). Without the use of qualitative methods, it would be impossible to penetrate the 
surface to deconstruct the complexity and unveil the underlying interests that are at work 
defining social reality in the world of global telecommunication standards. 
 
 
3.2 Qualitative Research Design Framework  
 
The research design provides a logical framework to govern the research process. If one does 
not exist explicitly then it will exist implicitly (Yin, 2009). Qualitative research requires an 
interactive framework that allows for the different components to be assessed in relation to 
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one another (Maxwell, 2012). Below figure 3.1 displays Maxwell’s interactive model of 
research design that shows the key components and their interaction. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Research design framework (Maxwell, 2012) 
 
At the center of the model are the research questions that are informed by the research goals 
and received literature and enacted by the methods and criteria for validity. The model 
governs the research logic by making explicit links among the key design components that 
need to be defined and substantiated. Thus, not only is the content of each component 
important, but also the coherence among the components as represented by the arrows in the 
model.   
 
Below in figure 3.2 is a representation of the research design framework for this thesis using 
Maxwell’s model. 
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Figure 3.2 Thesis research design framework 
 
From a case study perspective, Yin (2009) cites five components that are important to all 
research designs. Due to the extensive use of case studies in the thesis, a description of each 
component in relation to Maxwell’s model is provided below: 
 
Study Questions 
This component is the same as “research questions” in Maxwell’s model. Methodological fit 
in relation to case studies is associated with the use of “how” and “why” based research or 
study questions. Though the main research question above is crafted broadly, many of the 
related sub-questions in the papers are formulated to investigate and deconstruct specific areas 
of interest. Below are relevant sub-questions from each of the four papers: 
 
• How did the actors and the court in the landmark Microsoft case define 
FRAND in its relation to SEP value? (Paper 1) 
• How did the different business model logics impact the choice of SEP 
valuation theories presented by the key stakeholders and accepted by the court 
in the four initial FRAND court cases in the US? (Paper 2) 
• How do Qualcomm and ARM leverage their intellectual property in the 
technology and product market? (Paper 3) 
• How have SEP holders experienced patent holdout in their SEP licensing 
activities? (Paper 4) 
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Study Propositions  
This component is similar to the “conceptual framework” in Maxwell’s model though it is 
more analogous with the stating of hypotheses in deductive methodologies. Yin (2009) states 
that propositions are needed to guide the study and that even exploratory studies should state 
their purpose so that there can be criteria to judge the success. A general proposition is that 
intellectual property plays a fundamental role in regulating openness in collaborative 
innovation processes. In particular, patents are essential (excuse the pun) to the development 
and commercialization of many telecommunication standards in the knowledge economy, 
especially due to the increased fragmentation of the value chain. Below are several initial key 
propositions from the papers in the thesis related to patent holdup theory discussed in section 
2.4.1: 
 
• US courts are capable of complex apportionment in FRAND/SEP cases that do 
not systemically result in excessive patent damage awards (Paper 1,2) 
• Stakeholder communication of general theories on patent holdup and royalty 
stacking is more powerful than empirical evidence in many arenas (Paper 2) 
• The royalty base for licensing in telecommunication standards is different 
depending on the standard and the historical market norms  (Paper 3) 
• The weakening of injunctive relief can create a systematic patent holdout 
problem (Paper 4) 
 
The challenge with initial study propositions in exploratory, interpretive research is to avoid 
having the proposition taint the epistemic lens of the investigation. 
 
Unit of Analysis  
This component relates to the overall scope of the study and is not specifically articulated in 
Maxwell’s model. Yin (2009) suggests that defining the unit of analysis will help the 
researcher “distinguish data about the subject of your case study (the phenomenon) from data 
external to the case (the context)”. The primary unit of analysis in this thesis is the social 
artifact, FRAND and the related concept of SEP value, in relation to two main groups, the 
firm and society, and several supporting groups (i.e. arenas), such as SSOs, competition 
authorities, courts, etc. 
 
Below is an example of the multiple case study conducted in paper 2, including the primary 
units of analysis as shown in figure 3.3 below. 
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Figure 3.3 Multiple case studies with embedded units 
 
 
Logic Linking the Data to the Propositions 
This component is focused on defining the analytic techniques that will be used to analyze the 
data in relation to the purpose or propositions of the study and is similar to the “method” 
component in Maxwell’s model. The following primary sources of data were used in this 
thesis: 
 
• Case law and regulatory information  
• Statistical analysis of industry data  
• Open and semi-structured interviews and surveys  
 
Criteria for Interpreting the Findings  
This component is focused on the quality of the research results from an epistemological 
perspective and is similar to the “validity” component in Maxwell’s model. This research 
study will enlist several strategies including the investigation of rival explanations, “peer 
debriefing”, “member checks” as well as triangulation through the use of multiple data 
sources and methods. This issue will be discussed in further depth in the section below on 
research quality. 
 
3.3 Research Design Options – strengths and weaknesses 
 
Flick (2009) outlines five basic qualitative research designs – snapshots, case studies, 
retrospective studies, longitudinal studies, and comparative studies. The snapshot and 
comparative design have been consolidated together with the design named “cross-sectional” 
studies.90 Below is a description of the strengths and weakness of each design including a 
specific discussion of case studies as the primary design of this research project. 
																																								 																				90	Bryman	and	Bell	(2011)	consider	the	comparative	design	as	”essentially	two	or	more	cross-sectional	studies	carried	out	at	more	or	less	the	same	point	in	time.”		
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Comparative/Cross-sectional studies 
In comparative or cross-sectional studies the focus of the research is the detection of patterns 
across multiple cases (i.e. different contexts) and variables at a given point in time (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011). Through the study of variation, this research design allows for a deep 
understanding of specific phenomena (i.e. relationships between variables) in the current state 
of affairs (Flick, 2009). The main weakness is that the temporal dimension is fixed, which 
doesn’t allow for a process or development perspective. This limits the ability to draw causal 
relationships and reduces the internal validity of the results (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Comparative design elements can be found throughout the four papers of the thesis but are 
most relevant to Paper 4 that relies heavily on semi-structured interviews and a survey. 
However, the extent of the analysis is more exploratory than explanatory due to the small 
sample size, allowing for initial testing of propositions. 
 
Retrospective studies 
In retrospective studies, the focus is on the analysis of historical events and processes (Flick, 
2009). A key strength is the ability to investigate an activity that has already occurred and 
thus can provide temporal information on process development. The main weakness is the 
reliance on the memories and potential revisionist interpretation of the persons historically 
involved.91 Data is typically collected using narrative methods and analyzed with narrative 
and hermeneutic approaches with the focus on developing theories (Flick, 2009). In this 
thesis, the historical development of mobile telephony standards was investigated to 
understand the changing context of the market/regulatory environment in which FRAND has 
evolved.  
 
Longitudinal studies 
Longitudinal studies are comparative studies focused on the collection of data over several 
time intervals in real time92, which can be seen as a number of cross-sectional studies of a 
phenomenon taken over time (Åhlström and Karlsson, 2009). Flick (2009) states that 
longitudinal studies are seldom used in qualitative research, which is echoed by Pettigrew 
(1997) who stated: "for many the social sciences are still an exercise in comparative statics." 
Given the importance in managerial processes and organizational change, it is unusual that 
more studies are not conducted from a dynamic perspective, however, the time commitment 
required to conduct longitudinal studies can be extensive. Beyond the chronicling of 
beginning and end states, longitudinal studies can investigate the path taken between these 
states, which are often discontinuous and open-ended, exposing the relationship between 
context and action (Pettigrew, 1997). As the battle over FRAND has been quite intense, 
numerous events have played out in real time over the past four years of this thesis. In 
																																								 																				91	For	a	description	of	the	revisionist	dilemma	in	retrospective	studies	involving	popular	management	literature,	see	Rosenzweig	(2007).	92	This	is	different	than	only	investigating	the	temporal	dimension	in	retroactive	studies.	Pettigrew	(1997)	describes	processual	analysis	as	capturing	time	through	a	combination	of	retrospective	and	real-time	analysis.		
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particular, the court cases investigated in Paper 2 and their subsequent appeals represent a 
longitudinal investigation of the communicative game to define FRAND in the judicial arena. 
 
Case studies 
Case studies are a popular form of business research that allows for an in-depth study of 
complex phenomena within single settings or contexts where the boundaries between the 
phenomena and the context are not clearly evident. (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 
2009). Case studies typically use a mixture of data collection methods, including both 
quantitative and qualitative, and can be deployed to provide a description, test theory, and 
generate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Yin (2009) emphasizes that case study designs should be 
chosen based on their methodological fit as determined by the type of research questions 
(typically how and why questions), the requirement for control of behavioral events (not 
necessary as in experimental designs), and the focus on contemporary events.93  Though seen 
as answering important questions beyond the scope of other research designs, case studies 
have traditionally been criticized for several weaknesses. Yin (2009) describes four major 
prejudices including (1) the lack of rigor in operationalizing case studies and consequential 
concerns over validity, (2) the lack of a basis for scientific generalization, (3) the extended 
length of time to conduct and massive documents that result, and (4) the lack of ability to 
demonstrate causal relationship in comparison to experimental research designs.  Some of 
these weaknesses can be overcome through the use of a multiple case study design, which can 
be useful to generate a more robust understanding of phenomena across similar contexts 
(literal replications) or contrasting contexts (theoretical replications), in particular, when using 
cases to deductively test propositions (Yin, 2009).  
 
The use of case studies was a good methodological fit given the primary qualitative, 
exploratory approach of the thesis. Paper 1 deployed an in-depth single case study of the 
landmark US court decision while Paper 2 conducted a multiple, comparative case study 
method across the four first FRAND court decisions in the US to address the heterogeneity 
SEP value models in relation to business models of the stakeholders. Paper 3 also conducted a 
multiple, comparative case study of two leading firms in the telecommunication value chain 
to exemplify the new division of innovative labor and the tension between market and legal 
norms in the transition from an industrial to knowledge-based business models. All case 
studies were delineated with respect to the specific area of inquiry in each paper, thus 
allowing for a rigorous investigation within the relevant scope. The case studies utilized is this 
thesis facilitate the dialectic approach, allowing for the deconstruction of the key areas of 
contention and an evaluation of their epistemic foundation and level of reification in relation 
to private and public interests. 
 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
																																								 																				93	Yin	(2009)	defines	case	studies	as	contemporary	and	thus	differentiated	from	retrospective	studies.	My	belief	is	that	this	distinction	is	not	as	important	as	the	need	to	investigate	complex	phenomena	in	a	bounded,	dependent	context,	whether	historical	or	current.	
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For a case study research design to succeed at deconstructing social constructs and 
understanding the reification process at work, it must rely on multiple sources of data and an 
iterative analytical approach to make sense of the contradictory understandings and 
interpretations inherent in institutional facts, especially those in formation or reformation. The 
following primary sources of data were used in this thesis: 
 
Case law and regulatory information 
One of the most valid sources of data comes from information submitted to governmental 
organizations, such as court testimony, regulatory investigations, governmental hearings, SEC 
filings, etc. These documents provide accurate financial, market and business strategy 
information under penalty of law. This is the primary source of data for papers 1-3. Papers 1-2 
do not evaluate the opinions of the court cases from a traditional legal perspective. Instead, 
information is adduced from the court cases and used to analyze how economic and legal 
principles are applied by market actors and interpreted by the court in relation to economic 
and organizational implications, for example, on economic performance and efficiency. The 
specific sources are detailed in the appended papers. 
 
Structured and semi-structured interviews and surveys  
Interviews were used to generate insights into the communicative game on the multiple arenas 
as well as verify results of the studies. Multiple experts were used from organizations with 
different ideologies and interests to control bias. Surveys were used to validate initial 
propositions gathered through interviews in paper 4 when public sources of statistical data 
were unavailable. Interviews were used as a source of insights and feedback in papers 1-3, but 
never as a source of empirical findings. All information discerned from interviews that 
influenced the results of the thesis were validated by external sources and referenced.  This 
allowed for the respondents' names and organizations to be kept confidential to increase the 
access to information without negatively influencing the objectivity of the results. Paper 4 
uses interviews to identify theoretical propositions that were further investigated 
quantitatively through a survey. The specific use of interviews and surveys is detailed in the 
appended papers.  
 
Statistical analysis of industry data  
When possible, industry data from trusted governmental or 3rd party sources was used to 
describe a particular context or validate a specific proposition. This was primarily used in 
paper 4. The specific use and sources of statistical data are detailed in the appended papers.  
 
The triangulation process, where different data and methods converged in this thesis to define 
FRAND as an institutional fact, is shown in figure 3.4 below.94 
 
																																								 																				94	All	four	methods	of	triangulation	defined	by	Patton	(2002)	were	deployed	to	different	degrees,	including	data	triangulation,	investigator	triangulation,	theory	triangulation,	and	methodological	triangulation.	
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Figure 3.4 Triangulation - Convergence of multiple sources of evidence 
 
Regarding the analysis of data, Yin (2009) proposes a predominantly deductive orientation in 
arguing for the analytical “testing” of predetermined theoretical propositions as opposed to 
Eisenhardt (1989), who focuses on theory generation through an inductive method.95 In this 
thesis, an iterative approach, starting with a predominantly inductive exploratory phase to 
develop and ground theoretical propositions, was followed by proposition testing in the 
second phase.   The oscillation between inductive and deductive research methods was 
operationalized through what can best be described as systematic combining, described as “a 
nonlinear, path-dependent process of combining efforts with the ultimate objective of 
matching theory and reality” – see figure 3.5 below (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Process of systematic combing (Dubois and Gadde, 2002) 
 
 
																																								 																				95	Eisenhardt	(1989)	states	”theory-building	research	is	begun	as	close	as	possible	to	the	ideal	of	no	theory	under	consideration	and	no	hypotheses	to	test.”	The	author	does,	however,	promote	the	use	of	research	questions	and	the	definition	of	initial	constructs	and	variables.	
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Systematic combining facilitates multiple analytical techniques to be deployed simultaneously 
and iteratively in the spirit of grounded theory.96 Thus the more deductive focused techniques 
espoused by Yin (2009), such as pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, 
logic models, and cross-case synthesis, can be combined with grounded theory techniques to 
form an abductive logic through systematic combining. This combination allows for the 
critical approach necessary to deconstruct institutional facts. 
 
3.5 Value of Research Design 
 
In relation to the management discipline in general and the intellectual property discipline in 
particular, my research design has several characteristics that could be described as 
progressive. The first element is the dialectic approach that allows for an operationalization of 
a mixed epistemological orientation (i.e. an objective and subjective epistemology). This 
addresses the problem in the discipline where much of the management research admits that 
intellectual property and other institutions are socially constructed, but then proceed to study 
the phenomenon as "brute facts" using quantitative, positive methods. Few studies explicitly 
investigate the reification process with the goal to develop a new theory. The second element 
builds on the first by deploying a deconstructionist methodology in the collection and analysis 
of the data through an abductive approach as shown in figure 3.5 below. This allows for a 
critical approach to be applied to both received theory and empirical evidence. The third 
element is the interdisciplinary use of theory, in particular, the bringing together of 
perspectives from legal, economic, and organizational management theory. Most research in 
the field is focused on a law and economics perspective or a technology management 
perspective, but few combine these disciplines. The fourth element is the lack of case studies 
related to intellectual property in general and intellectual property and standards in 
particular.97 
 
 
																																								 																				96	Grounded	theory	is	a	constant	comparative	method	where	theories	are	constructed	inductively	through	the	investigation	of	empirical	data.	For	Strauss	and	Corbin	(1994)	grounded	theories	are	”inclusive	of	the-the	multiple	perspectives	of	the	actors”,	which	fits	well	with	an	interpretive	approach	to	the	study	of	institutional	facts.	97	In	fact,	Gibbert	et	al.	(2008)	report	that	only	6%	of	the	published	articles	in	the	ten	leading	management	journals	from	1995-2000	where	based	on	case	studies.			
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Figure 3.5 Schematic of abductive research process used in thesis 
 
3.6 Quality Criteria 
 
Quality in research is an epistemological issue at the heart of scientific inquiry that defines the 
criteria for what is considered valid knowledge. As the traditional measures of validity and 
reliability stem from natural science and a quantitative, positivistic epistemology, defining 
quality criteria for qualitative research is still under discussion and development (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011; Flick, 2009; Gibbert et al., 2008; Lincoln, 1995).98 While standard validity and 
reliability concepts have been adapted to qualitative research (Yin, 2009), alternative criteria 
have also emerged for assessing qualitative research. In particular, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
propose the quality concept of trustworthiness, where credibility, transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability are used as alternatives to validity and reliability. The main 
purpose of these alternative criteria is to acknowledge that more than one account of social 
reality is feasible (i.e. there is no one ‘truth’), especially in relation to institutional facts 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
 
Below is a short description of the quality criteria from Lincoln and Guba (1985) applied on 
this thesis:  
 
 
Credibility  
Credibility is used as a replacement for construct validity99 and internal validity100 but with a 
more constructionist focus on the acceptability of the often multiple accounts that define 
institutional facts. As there is no one correct answer in qualitative research, the focus of 
																																								 																				98	Sutton	(1997)	goes	as	far	as	to	provide	advice	when	not	to	explicitly	state	qualitative	processes	so	as	enhance	the	opportunity	for	publication	in	a	publishing	paradigm	still	dominated	by	a	quantitative	leaning	epistemology		99	Construct	validity	defines	how	well	the	research	measures	what	it	is	intending	to	measure	(i.e.	are	the	operational	measures	capable	of	measuring	the	constructs	under	investigation).	100	Internal	validity	defines	the	strength	of	the	match	or	causal	relationship	linking	theoretical	concepts	and	empirical	observations.	
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credibility is to generate acceptance of the researcher's account (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The 
thesis deployed several methods to increase the credibility of the results as prescribed by 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), including multiple sources of information (see figure 3.4) and 
iterative peer debriefing and member checking by industry, academic, and policy experts. 
This took the form of multiple interviews, conversations, presentations, and readings of 
working papers. In addition, papers 1-3 have undergone academic review in the publishing 
process. The more deductive method of Paper 4 relied on semi-structured pre-interviews to 
complement the sparse literature as a means to develop credible operational propositions to 
investigate in the survey.  
 
Transferability 
Transferability is used as a replacement for external validity.101 As qualitative research is 
typically focused on depth within a unique context, the positivistic definition of 
generalizability is untenable in its traditional perspective. The thesis uses extensive citations 
to reliable, public sources of information in the case studies to facilitate transferability. Many 
of the general insights of the thesis, though focused on telecommunication standards, would 
likely be applicable to other open innovation platforms operating under FRAND terms in 
different sectors, especially the social constructionist model. However, a major finding of the 
thesis is that caution should be given in relation to transferability from one context to another 
(e.g. in relation to court decisions and across different standards). 
 
Dependability 
Dependability is used as a replacement for reliability102 but with a focus on the level of good 
practice to research procedure as opposed to replicability. As in the case of transferability 
above, the use of extensively cited public documents, in particular, court and regulatory 
information under penalty of law increases the dependability of the research. The use of 
confidential interviews and surveys to increases the quality of information but can be seen to 
lower the dependability. 
 
Confirmability 
Confirmability is used as a replacement for objectivity103 but focused more on the good faith 
effort of the researcher to manage the intrusion of values on their research than on complete 
objectivity. The growing consensus is that it is not feasible for researchers to completely keep 
their values in check and therefore values will not only impact how we see things but also 
what we see (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Two methods to manage the risks associated with 
confirmability have been deployed in this thesis – auditing and self-reflection. The former 
method, auditing, was enacted primarily through the use of rival reviewers from industry, 
academia, and government organizations as described above. The latter method will be 
discussed in-depth below. 
 
																																								 																				101	External	validity	defines	the	degree	to	which	the	research	findings	can	be	generalized	to	other	settings.	102	Reliability	defines	the	degree	to	which	the	operational	procedures	of	the	research	can	be	repeated	with	the	same	results.	103	Objectivity	is	based	on	the	belief	that	there	is	a	’truth’	independent	of	the	influence	of	the	researcher.	
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Self-reflection, or reflexivity, was an important process throughout the entire thesis, 
especially given that the research was partially funded by an industry actor in the 
telecommunication industry.104 Below are several measures deployed in the thesis to manage 
bias from the perspective of internal and external ideology and interests:  
 
• Research funding was managed as an unrestricted grant to the university, and the 
research was conducted as an academic, not consulting, project 
• Information and insights provided by industry actors was verified through public, 
reliable sources before being included in the thesis 
• An exploratory, qualitative research strategy with a deconstructionist approach was 
chosen to avoid the pressure to find a generalizable ‘truth’ and ‘prove’ causality 
• Normativity in the papers has been purposely managed with the goal to unveil the 
communicative game as opposed to supporting specific positions (e.g. by providing a 
social constructionist model of FRAND and SEP value). However, it should be noted 
that the thesis is to a large extent a response to the bias of academic, industry, and 
policy positions based on little supporting empirical evidence. Thus if there is a 
normative agenda is it to level the playing field to allow for a more holistic decision-
making process by policy-makers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																								 																				104	The	literature	review	revealed	a	large	percentage	of	published	papers	were	funded	by	industry	actors,	including	the	seminal	2007	article	by	Lemley	and	Shapiro.	
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4.  Summary and Interconnection Among Papers 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to better understand how competing interests seek to define 
the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of SEPs.  Specifically, the focus is to explore 
the battle to define the meaning of FRAND through understanding the market interests, 
ideological concepts, and the communicative game on the legitimizing arenas.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship among appended papers 
 
Figure 4.1 above describes the relationship between the appended papers. Paper 1 provides an 
in-depth, single case study of the landmark Microsoft case and is complemented by Paper 2, 
which shows a comparative analysis across the four initial SEP/FRAND cases in US district 
court. Papers 1-2 generated several key theoretical concepts defining the meaning of FRAND 
that were further investigated in the following papers. In Paper 3, a comparative analysis of 
legal and market norms is conducted through case studies and doctrinal legal analysis from 
the theoretical perspective of the intellectual value chain leading to better understanding of 
how the determination of royalty base impacts SEP value. Finally, in Paper 4, the concepts of 
patent holdup and holdout are analyzed in relation to mainstream economic theory, and patent 
holdout is further investigated through market data as well as interviews and a survey with 
industry experts. Together these papers address the main purpose and research questions of 
this thesis.  
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4.1 Paper 1 – The Viability of FRAND: How the Seminal Microsoft 
Ruling Could Impact the Value of Standard Essential Patents and the 
Future of Telecom Standards    
 
This paper addresses the viability of FRAND policies to regulate the equilibrium between 
patent holdup and freeriding (or patent holdout) in the context of telecommunication 
standards. As market transactions are executed in the shadow of the norms of the court 
system, the relation between FRAND and the judicial arena is the main focus. Using the 
landmark Microsoft ruling, this paper seeks to investigate (1) what were the state of the art 
valuation principles deployed by the court to determine FRAND royalty rates and (2) what 
were the key areas of contention regarding how the valuation principles are reduced to 
practice and deployed as valuation methods by the court, (3) how generalizable are the 
decisions by the court on other standardization contexts, and (4) what are the implications of 
these valuation methods on industry strategy and policy. These are particularly important 
issues as they define the value of standard essential patents, which is one of the key 
battleground issues in the struggle to define the agenda for a new patent era, where the role of 
patents as a tool to facilitate innovation and welfare is being challenged. Below is a short 
summary of the findings. 
 
Analysis of Microsoft Decision 
 
The 207-page decision by Judge Robart in the Microsoft case highlighted the following key 
factors in the valuation of SEPs in a FRAND context: 
 
1. Five guiding principles for SEP valuation of which four focused on static efficiency 
and one on dynamic efficiency. 
 
2. A FRAND-modified version of the Georgia-Pacific factors adapted primarily to 
accommodate the principle that a FRAND royalty should be based on the economic 
value of the contribution of the patented invention apart from the value associated with 
its inclusion in the standard (i.e. the holdup value). 
 
3. A qualitative SEP valuation analysis, including: 
• An ex ante evaluation of the SEP portfolio in comparison to competing 
technologies at the time of standardization. 
• An ex post evaluation of the SEP portfolio in relation to its use value in the 
standard and the impact in the end products. 
 
4. A quantitative SEP valuation analysis using multiple royalty bases and methods, 
including: 
• Market comparable rates from both successful and unsuccessful patent pools 
related to the standards in the case with an implied end product royalty base. 
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• Market comparable rate from the computer chip industry on a component level 
royalty base. 
• Feature Factor Method deployed in a prior valuation of the SEP portfolio by a 
consultancy firm with an end product royalty base. 
 
Main Areas of Contention 
 
Below are several areas of contention present in the Microsoft case that will likely define the 
viability of FRAND to facilitate collaboration among diverse stakeholders in standardization 
settings. 
 
1. Ex Ante Evaluations Applied Ex Post 
The use of comparative analysis of competing technologies prior to the setting of the standard 
(i.e. ex ante analysis) was deployed by the court retrospectively as a means to eliminate the 
holdup value of the SEP portfolio despite the fact that the court itself acknowledged that it 
"lacked real-world applicability" and cited its “impracticality with respects to implementation 
by courts.” An important question is whether the comparison is made ex ante enough given 
the technology development decisions are made at the time of R&D investment prior to 
competition in standards.  
 
2. The Royalty Base and the Battle Over the Value Chain 
The court in Microsoft deployed multiple methods using different royalty bases to reach its 
decision. This implies that the logic of the apportionment argument in the valuation method 
takes precedence over a fast rule on the position of the royalty base. This ultimately will 
impact the distribution of profits in the value chain and the viability of IP-based business 
models.  
 
3. Market Comparables – Transforming Apples into Oranges 
The Microsoft court evaluated four different types of comparables to support its FRAND 
royalty determination – patent pool rates, previous licensing agreements employing the SEPs 
in suit, similar industry licensing agreements, and an expert valuation report. In addition, 
Motorola presented a number of prior license agreements including the specific SEPs in suit, 
but the court dismissed these. The varying contexts of these comparables leave open a wide 
range of objections and interpretations by future courts. As innovation specialists typically 
don't participate in patent pools, an important question is how the use of patent pool rates by 
courts impact the strategic behavior of innovation specialists and the rate of innovation in 
technology standards. 
 
Key Implications 
 
The Microsoft case offers several potential implications for reflection by industry and 
policymakers that impact the viability of FRAND and telecom standards, of which several 
key areas are described below. 
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1. A potential re-imbalancing of the value of SEPs from ad hoc holdup to systemic 
freeriding (i.e. holdout). The results of landmark cases have great potential to change 
the norms of how business is conducted. The fact that Motorola only received a small 
fraction of what they had originally demanded has already impacted the belief among 
many IP and licensing professionals that SEPs are now of much less value. Thus the 
normative impact of this landmark case could produce a downward pressure on all 
SEPs regardless of the context, which could swing the pendulum from a fear of holdup 
to a condition of systemic freeriding or holdout. 
 
2. Innovation specialists may need to reconsider the risk profile of their 
standardization strategies and business models. The Microsoft ruling, in 
combination with a growing pressure on actors labeled as non-practicing entities 
(NPEs), will require innovation specialist firms to rethink their mode of involvement 
in standards and their position in the value chain to manage the risk of potentially 
increasing efforts to weaken the strength of SEP holders. This can impact innovation 
and overall economic efficiency by impacting the development of a division of 
innovative labor in the market. 
 
3. Firm strategy will continue to shift from winning the game to changing the rules 
of the game. Implementation specialists, in particular, will be incentivized to delay 
negotiation of FRAND licenses and instead focus on weakening the concept of 
FRAND through judicial, legislative, policy, and regulatory means. In this regard the 
Microsoft case exemplifies the potential impact of affecting the norms of FRAND on a 
systemic level.  
 
4. Reinforcement of the fear of holdup leading to new policy proposals by SSOs, 
regulatory bodies, and legislatures. While the Microsoft case could certainly be 
characterized as an anecdotal case of patent holdup, there is still no evidence of 
systematic patent holdup in either the H.264 or 802.11 standards, having been in use 
for 10 and 16 years, respectively, under FRAND-enabled IPR policies. This indicates 
that there is not sufficient theoretical or empirical evidence to warrant major policy 
changes as the systemic consequences of these changes could negatively impact 
economic efficiency, in particular, through an unfavorable tradeoff of static efficiency 
for dynamic efficiency that only redistributes instead of enhances economic surplus. 
Thus the Microsoft case is proof that isolated instances of patent holdup can be 
adjudicated by the US court system without the need of systemic policy reform that 
can have unintended systemic consequences. 
 
5. Different standards will experience different dispute profiles. One main insight 
from different levels of success of the patent pools in the Microsoft case is that 
standards should not be treated as homogeneous (i.e. each standard has its own market 
context and norms). If this is true one might expect very little if any litigation with 
respect to the H.264 standard in the future. The 802.11 standard, on the other hand, 
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will likely experience greater litigation as WiFi is a large industry of its own with a 
growing number of innovation specialists and other non-practicing entities in the form 
of current and potential SEP holders. 
 
6. Motorola lost but Google may have won. While the initial match-up between 
Motorola and Microsoft represented two competing philosophies on the value of 
SEPs, the purchase of Motorola by Google changes the dynamic. It could be argued 
that neither Google nor Microsoft benefit from strong SEPs and high FRAND 
royalties based on their current, predominate business models. This exemplifies the 
complexity of the market environment where different actors in the value chain use 
patents for completely different purposes, meaning that the same patents can vary 
greatly in perceived value based on the business strategy of their owners. As new 
entrants into the telecommunication sector develop their R&D capacity and SEP 
portfolios, this will lead to new rhetorical positions on the value of SEPs, thus 
requiring courts and policymakers to view SEPs with a systemic, long-term view 
based on longitudinal evidence, not short-term business interests. 
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4.2  Paper 2 – Valuing Standard Essential Patents in the Knowledge 
Economy: A Comparison of FRAND Royalty Methodologies in U.S. 
Courts 
 
This paper focuses on a comparative assessment of the SEP valuation models of four recent 
SEP court cases in the US in 2013-14 and discusses their systemic implications for industry 
and policymakers (both SSO and governmental) regarding the potential impact on economic 
performance and economic efficiency in the context of the shift from industrial to knowledge-
based business models. Specifically, this study investigates (1) the impact of evolving 
knowledge-based market structures and firm positioning on SEP value and (2) the 
operationalization of valuation principles and norms based on competing business 
models/value logics and competing theories of patent holdup, royalty stacking, and economic 
efficiency in the FRAND context.  These investigations are then formulated into a set of 
propositions towards an improved theoretical understanding of patent value in the knowledge 
economy. Below is a short summary of the findings. 
 
 
Comparative Analysis of SEP Court Cases in the US   
 
The study includes the analysis of four recent US SEP court cases, including the landmark 
SEP ruling by the Western District of Washington (Microsoft v. Motorola) and three 
subsequent FRAND cases in the Eastern District of Texas (Ericson v. D-Link et al. and 
CSIRO v. Cisco Systems) and the Northern District of Illinois (Innovatio IP Ventures). Below 
table 1 provides comparative information across the four district court cases. 
 
 
																																								 																				105	Note	that	Microsoft	sued	for	breach	of	contract,	so	Motorola/Google	is	the	actor	seeking	FRAND	royalties	for	their	SEP	portfolio.	
Plaintive Defendants Trial Standa
rd 
No. 
of  
SEPs 
Value Base* FRAND 
Rate 
Microsoft
105 
Motorola 
Mobility 
(Google) 
Bench 
 
 
 
 
H.264 
 
 
802.11 
16  
 
 
11  
MPEG-LA 
patent pool 
 
Mixed basea  
 
$0.00555  
 
 
$0.03471 
Ericsson D-Link, Netgear. 
Belkin, Dell, HP, 
Acer, Toshiba, 
Intel 
 
Jury 802.11 3 Previous 
industry 
licenses with 
3rd parties  
$0.15 
 
Innovatio Cisco, Motorola Bench 802.11 19  Chipset profits $0.0956 
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* The term value base is used to denote the source from which the FRAND royalty was calculated 
a Based on an average of Via patent pool rates, prior non-FRAND 3rd-party component-level license 
agreement, and a prior consultancy valuation report 
Source: Official trial documents 
 
Table 1 Comparative overview of recent FRAND cases 
 
In addition, the court cases have been analyzed across the following parameters: 
 
1. Business models deployed by the litigants 
2. Translation of FRAND valuation principles into legal norms 
3. Application of ex ante evaluation methods 
4. Determination of royalty base and FRAND valuation logics and methods 
 
 
Key Findings and Implication on Economic Performance and Efficiency  
 
Below is a discussion of four key conceptual areas supported by the evidence of the four 
recent cases that together form a framework for further research regarding the value of SEPs 
in particular, and an enhanced theory of patent value in the knowledge economy, in general. 
 
1. Transition from a Production Logic to a Technology Logic 
The four SEP holders under study exemplified the increasing use of SEPs to generate revenue 
(i.e. technology logic) beyond the traditional production of physical products (i.e. production 
logic) by both practicing and non-practicing entities. Specifically, the four cases illustrated a 
diverse set of contexts and business models as described in section 2.1, including a mixed use 
of value logics as follows:  
 
• Practicing entities that deploy the standard in their own products but also look 
to monetize their superior SEP portfolio over other producing firms (e.g. 
Motorola and Ericsson). 
• Non-practicing entities that acquire patents from other market actors (including 
practicing entities) with the sole purpose of patent assertion to monetize the 
assets (e.g. Innovatio). 
• Non-practicing entities whose main function is only to perform R&D and rely 
completely on license-based business models to transfer their technology to the 
market (e.g. CSIRO) 
																																								 																				106	The	royalty	rate,	for	the	most	part,	is	not	explicitly	based	on	a	FRAND	commitment	due	to	the	historical	circumstances	of	CSIRO	relations	with	the	802.11	standard	and	the	wireless	industry.	
 
 
  
Solutions, 
SonicWALL, 
Netgear, HP 
 
CSIRO Cisco Systems Bench 802.11 1 End products $0.83106 
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Further empirical and theoretical research on the impact of the new division of innovative 
labor on the industrial value chain is required to better ascertain how different knowledge-
based modes of firm action affect economic performance and efficiency. 
 
2. The Context of Standards as a Determinant of SEP Value 
In addition to the emergence of new roles and value logics deployed by firms discussed 
above, there is evidence that the contextual nature of the standard itself may have the greatest 
impact on the value of SEPs. Thus the profile of how a standard was developed, in particular, 
the primary value logic of the stakeholder firms, can be observed by the licensing and 
litigation history involving the standard. Widespread infringement would suggest a 
technology logic while extensive cross-licensing or the formation of a successful patent pool 
would suggest a production logic. There is a need for further research on the techno-economic 
typology of different standards to confirm this proposition, however, this would imply that 
one-size fits all business norms, valuation methods, and policy measures will likely not be 
economically efficient. 
 
3. Conflicting Norms on Appropriate Royalty Base and Valuation Models 
The changing landscape of IP strategies and business models was also apparent in the 
different value logics that underpinned the choice of valuation methods put forward by the 
different actors across the four cases.  
While the US courts have a long history of determining reasonable royalties, it could be 
argued that these determinations have been primarily made within a production logic. For 
instance, legal norms for setting the royalty base, such as the rule implicating the smallest 
saleable patent-practicing unit or entire market value rule (EMVR), are designed from the 
perspective of an industrial value chain and may require further adaption to the new roles of 
IP and knowledge-based business models that often license different parts of the value chain. 
Therefore, it is not surprising, that in a changing paradigm from a production to a technology 
logic, the current legal norms are mismatched with traditional business norms, which leads to 
argumentation aligned to the existing legal norms instead of the current business reality. The 
cases show that SEP holders will likely need to show evidence of the market value of their 
SEPs through arms-length market transactions to prove the value through a technology logic. 
More research is needed to explain how the current legal norms address knowledge-based 
business models and its subsequent impact on economic performance and efficiency. 
 
4. Relevance of Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking  
Given the theoretical importance of the concepts of patent holdup and royalty stacking to the 
determination of SEP value, the dearth of evidence put forward by the market actors in the 
four recent cases suggests that they are not a significant market issue in the context of the 
H.264 and 802.11 standards. This further implies that FRAND contracts in their incomplete, 
historical interpretation have been successful in regulating patent holdup and royalty stacking 
issues in technology transactions among market actors at least in these standards. However, 
one important insight stemming from the lack of evidence of systemic patent holdup and 
royalty stacking in the studied cases is that policy measures designed to eliminate these 
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problems are possibly unnecessary and could potentially alter the balance, creating patent 
holdout that could reduce the quality of standards and reduce overall social welfare. More 
research is required that models the impact of policy interventions from both a dynamic and 
static efficiency perspective.  
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4.3 Paper 3 – Re-Evaluating Patent Damages in the Knowledge 
Economy: The Determination of Royalty Base for Standard Essential 
Patents from an Intellectual Value Chain Perspective 
 
This paper explores the applicability and implications of the current legal norms for the 
choice of royalty base in relation to the prevailing market norms regarding SEP transactions 
in the telecommunication industry. In particular, this paper investigates how US courts have 
deployed several procedural rules including the use of the smallest saleable patent-practicing 
unit (SSPPU) and the entire market value rule (EMVR) as a means to adjudicate patent 
damages. As these rules impact the determination of the royalty base, which can differ by 
orders of magnitude, the applicability of their use in different market contexts and norms 
requires investigation as their use by the courts could have a systemic effect on industrial 
dynamics and economic efficiency in specific markets, especially those reliant on open 
standards. Below is a short summary of the findings. 
 
 
Positioning of License Agreements in the Telecommunication Value Chain 
 
In the telecommunication industry, the market norms for the location of SEP licensing is 
typically at the position of the end product in the value chain as shown in figure 1 below. On 
the lower layer, the figure depicts a generic telecommunication material value chain 
consisting of component manufacturers (e.g. chipset producers), end product suppliers (e.g. 
brand owners and OEM/ODM), and customers (e.g. operators and/or end users). On the upper 
layer the figure shows how the results of R&D activities (e.g SEPs) are managed as 
intellectual property transactions (e.g. SEP licenses) through the intellectual value chain 
towards end product suppliers in the material value chain. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Position of SEP licensing in the telecommunication value chain 
 
The choice of FRAND licensing towards end product suppliers has evolved as the 
predominant market norm based on the following reasons: 
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1. Historical norms 
The history of cross-licensing among integrated firms in the telecommunication industry has 
created a strong norm among actors to license SEPs at the end product supplier position in the 
value chain. This norm has persisted even as the value chain has transformed and fragmented 
to include new divisions of labor. This norm can be seen in how firms make royalty 
declarations, in the specification of “fully compliant” product licensing in FRAND 
commitments, in the licensing unit of patent pools, in recent ITC rulings, and in the recent 
SEP court cases in the US, where the end product supplier has typically been the defendant.  
 
2. Risk Management 
For integrated firms that maintain both strong SEP portfolios and produce physical products, 
the position of SEP licensing is important for managing their exposure to the SEP portfolios 
of other integrated firms.  
 
3. Value capture 
SEP holding firms are profit maximizers, the same as all commercial firms. Given the 
opportunity to choose the position of the value chain in which to license SEP portfolios, a 
rational firm would choose a position that best reflected the value of the contribution of their 
technology.  
 
 
Case studies 
 
In order to better understand knowledge-based business models in the context of the 
telecommunication value chain, both the MVC and IVC, two short cases are examined 
individually first and then collectively to illustrate their interaction. The first case is 
Qualcomm, exemplifying a leading company originating from the telecommunication sector 
that operates in the both the MVC and IVC selling both components and licensing SEPs as 
separate but interrelated business models towards OEM/ODMs. The second case is ARM, 
exemplifying a leading company originating from the semiconductor/computer industry that 
operates exclusively in the IVC through a pure IP-based business model towards 
semiconductor/chip providers.107 
 
While this study describes how different business models in the MVC and IVC operate and 
interact, it is also helpful to illustrate how different knowledge-based business models interact 
in the telecommunication value chain. Figure 2 below shows how the ARM and Qualcomm 
IP-based business models interface in the IVC, where ARM processor IP cores are licensed to 
Qualcomm, who integrates them together with other technology blocks to provide full system-
																																								 																				107	Though	ARM	does	not	license	SEPs,	it	does	license	IP	and	has	become	a	major	actor	in	the	telecommunication	value	chain	through	the	convergence	of	the	mobile	computing	segment.	It	is	used	here	to	illustrate	differences	in	IP	licensing	norms	in	relation	to	Qualcomm	and	other	SEP	licensing	telecommunication	firms.	It	is	a	particularly	relevant	example	given	that	ARM's	licensing	practice	was	used	as	a	comparable	industry	license	in	determining	the	FRAND	royalty	range	and	rate	in	the	landmark	
Microsoft	ruling	recently	upheld	on	appeal	by	the	US	9th	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals.	
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on-a-chip (SoC) solutions for mobile devices. Qualcomm subsequently licenses its SEP 
portfolio to OEM/ODMs manufacturing end products.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interrelationship of ARM and Qualcomm IP-Based Business Models 
 
The location of licensing in the telecommunication value chain (i.e. royalty base) of both the 
ARM and Qualcomm licensing models represents the influence of historical norms where 
ARM has its roots as a semiconductor company in the computer industry and Qualcomm has 
its roots as fully integrated telecommunication company. These different histories also 
manifest themselves in relation to the nature of the scope of their different IP portfolios. 
While ARM's IP relates primarily to the function and implementation of processor-based 
chips, Qualcomm's standard-essential IP relates to the entire telecommunication system (e.g. 
the 3G or WiFi communication system) with some functionality implemented on the chip 
level and others on the device and system level. Thus historical industry norms and the scope 
of the relevant technical system together with strategic business considerations based on 
bargaining power in the value chain have all impacted the current configuration and roles 
played by ARM and Qualcomm in the telecommunication value chain.  
 
Analysis of IVC-based principles and market norms in relation to current legal norms 
for determination of royalty base 
 
This section analyzes the impact of IVC principles and prevailing market norms on the 
interpretation of legal norms regarding apportionment and royalty base determinations in the 
adjudication of patent damages for standard-essential patents (SEPs). Five relevant areas of 
consideration have been highlighted to advise courts, regulators, SSOs, and other policy-
makers when interpreting and setting norms related to SEPs, FRAND, and standard-enabled 
markets. In particular, these five areas are meant to generate a better understanding of how the 
nature of the value of knowledge and the evolution of market norms in the telecommunication 
value chain should normatively influence the interpretation of legal norms to provide greater 
equity and economic efficiency. 
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1. The Value of Knowledge is Not Constrained by the Material Value Chain 
One key characteristic of a knowledge economy is the increased value of the knowledge 
component of value propositions. When we move from a MVC to IVC logic, one key 
challenge will be how to value different knowledge-based contributions delivered through 
multiple interrelated value propositions, such as knowledge embedded in physical products 
and knowledge packaged as license offers. In the context of patent damages, this would fall 
into the general category of the challenge of apportionment where the court has developed 
several procedural rules to help manage the complexity, such as SSPPU and EMVR. 
Therefore, the value of IP cannot always be defined simply by looking into the MVC. For 
example, the market norms in the telecommunication industry show that firms license SEPs 
separately from physical value propositions (e.g. chipsets) through the IVC towards end 
product, making the component level inappropriate as the royalty base without a necessary 
adjustment to account for customary business practice. 
 
2. Royalty Lacking – Components are Not Licensed in the Telecommunication 
Value Chain 
Building on the previous section above, the use of the SSPPU rule becomes increasingly 
challenging when the IP in question has not been licensed on the component level. As 
discussed previously, the norm in the telecommunication industry is to license SEPs at the end 
product position in the value chain, which effectively means that the component level is left 
unlicensed. This creates a downward pressure on the price of components creating what could 
be termed as a reverse royalty-stacking or “royalty lacking” problem if a component level 
royalty base is chosen in an industry that doesn’t license SEPs at the component level.  
 
3. Market Norms are to License SEPs on Fully-Compliant End Products 
Based on historical norms and strategic behavior, SEP holders in the telecommunication value 
chain primarily license SEPs on fully compliant products sold by end product suppliers. This 
practice has existed now for quite some time, especially in cellular standards, though 
increasingly in WiFi standards, however, with less evidence of traditional licensing activity. 
While numerous antitrust inquiries have examined SEP licensing practice, to date no 
competition authority has found the practice of SEP licensing to the end product position of 
the value chain to be anti-competitive. However, it is possible that different industries and 
industry segments may have different norms as the Qualcomm and ARM cases in this paper 
demonstrate. 
 
4. Standards Drive Market Demand by Definition 
For consortium-based telecommunication standards, it is particularly difficult to separate the 
standard-setting process from the construction of the market. However, different actors view 
standards in different ways. For implementation firms the standard is a means to facilitate the 
sale of products and services, while for innovation specialists and large SEP portfolio holders, 
the standard is viewed as a product itself. The use of SSPPU and EMVR can be seen as a 
means by the court to manage the complexity of determining patent damages in multi-
technology products, however, the distinction is too digital. The EMVR requirement that the 
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end product cannot be used as the base if the patents in suit are not proven to drive the 
demand for the product is not applicable for standards that drive market demand by definition.  
 
5. Market Norms are Embedded in SEP License Agreements 
The use of the Georgia-Pacific Factors (GPFs) provides an opportunity for market norms to 
be integrated into the determination of patent damages, in particular, GPFs 1-2. It is not a 
coincidence that these are the first two factors as courts have long acknowledged that the best 
measure of a reasonable royalty is an established royalty rate in the industry (i.e. market 
norms). Existing comparable licenses have market norms related to the royalty base and 
apportionment embedded intrinsically within the agreements. Existing licenses eliminate the 
need to determine these factors hypothetically as they have been determined in practice 
through an actual market transaction. In new areas where little case law exists, existing 
market agreements are valuable resources in supplying courts with important information on 
market norms. However, it is important that comparables are in fact comparable, so caution 
should be used when comparing transactions across different standardization and market 
contexts. 
 
  
	 60	
4.4 Paper 4 – Patent Trespass and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the 
Nature and Impact of Patent Holdout 
 
This paper investigates the concept of “patent holdout” from a theoretical and empirical 
perspective, seeking to balance the predominant literature focused primarily on patent holdup. 
Its first ambition is to dissipate the definitional uncertainty surrounding patent holdout 
through a review of the meaning of holdout in mainstream economics in relation to its 
contemporary use of holdup and holdout in the patent context. Secondly, the paper provides a 
more empirical discussion of the strategies of technology implementers that practice a patent 
without a license and questions the use of the term, patent holdout. Lastly, the paper 
investigates the theoretical nature and empirical evidence of patent holdout from a 
transactional, systematic, and systemic perspective in relation to the concept of patent holdup. 
With this background, the paper attempts to identify the factors that determine the occurrence 
of transactional, systematic and systemic patent holdout, complementing the qualitative 
analysis with a quantitative measurement. 
 
From Patent Holdout to Patent Trespass 
In mainstream economics, holdout belongs to the wider category of situations of failed 
coordination and collective action problems amongst economic agents. Holdout is often 
compared, and contrasted, with the concept of externalities, which occur when B undertakes 
some desired action without taking into account the effects of its decisions on A. Holdout is 
also discussed, and distinguished, from free-riding (or freeloading).  In free-riding, A provides 
an imperfectly excludable good, and B can enjoy its benefits without contributing to the cost 
of provision. 
 
This inquiry leads to several first-order characteristics of holdout taken from mainstream 
economic theory: 
 
1. The holdout firm is the property owners and holdout power is a function of the 
effectiveness of the property rule. 
2. Holdout corresponds to a situation where strangers do not transact.  
3. Holdout can be considered both from a distributional and an efficiency perspective.   
4. Holdout is described as a form of self-interest. 
 
This lead to the unexpected discovery: holdout is a term of art, which invariably defines the 
conduct of a property owner, not the conduct of technology implementers. Furthermore, the 
current discourse on patent holdup has disregarded the historical use of the term “holdout”, 
replacing it instead with “holdup”, which has a specific meaning in transaction cost 
economics. As a result, the paper proposes to substitute the improper concept of patent 
holdout with the concept of “patent trespass”. 
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Patent Trespass Strategies 
At a very general level, patent trespass occurs when a firm practices a patented technology, an 
SEP in the context of this paper, yet refuses to take a license.  Our sample of interviews 
highlights several specificities of patent trespass (note that our respondents were interviewed 
on “holdout”, but for the reasons previously explained, we document our results in terms of 
trespass) as follows: 
 
1. Patent trespass is intentional and can, therefore, be distinguished from inadvertent 
patent infringement and the customary vetting process required to ascertain 
essentiality and validity in patent disputes in so far as this process is undertaken 
without the purpose to delay. 
2. Patent trespass manifests itself through less explicit strategies with the goal of 
eliminating or reducing the amount of royalties paid to the SEP holder.  
3. Patent trespass is not simply akin to a deferred payment due to significant transactions 
costs and potential loss of licensing opportunities.  
4. There is some symmetry between patent holdup and trespass.  A patent holdup 
situation necessitates that injunctive relief is available, otherwise, there is no 
compulsion to pay supra-FRAND rates.  In contrast, patent trespass exists when 
injunctive relief is not available, potentially leading to the compulsion to settle on sub-
FRAND rates.  
5. Trespassing firms may pursue strategic goals that go beyond pure revenue sharing, 
creating a collective action problem.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Patent trespass decision model 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the decision process for delay from the perspective of the SEP 
implementer based on the proposed elements of patent trespass defined above. The model 
depicts an initial offer (FRAND1) followed by the decision to accept or delay.  
 
Several stylized examples of patent trespass strategies are reported including: 
 
1. The trespassing firm offering negotiation terms that are not industry practice  
2. Delaying tactics deployed in terms of a litigation/arbitration strategy. 
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3. Affirmative steps to weaken the SEP holder’s position, including by starting invalidity 
proceedings before courts and patent offices, initiating antitrust complaints with 
competition agencies, and vindicating changes to patent policies before Standard 
Setting Organizations (SSOs). 
4. Employing “licensing in” departments whose job it is to avoid paying anything for 
patent implementation, including “licensing in litigation groups” whose purpose is to 
litigate against patent holders. 
 
Certainly, legitimate arguments can be made by SEP implementers regarding the tactics 
described above as many of these tactics involve issues fundamental to patent law, such as 
validity, infringement, jurisdiction, etc. The main question then becomes – at what point does 
a willing licensee, reasonably conducting due diligence and price negotiation, transition into 
an unwilling licensee, participating in a deliberate strategy of delay with the primary means to 
reduce its FRAND royalty payments?  
 
Determinants of Transactional, Systematic, and Systemic Patent Trespass 
In the patent holdup literature, systematic effects are said to occur because SEP users face a 
royalty stack.  And systemic effects are anticipated in the reduced investment incentives of 
manufacturers of complementary technologies.  As a mirror reflection of this, we say that 
trespass is systematic when a SEP owner faces a “royalty gap” – i.e. to refer the unlicensed 
segment of the market – and that systemic trespass occurs when there are adverse effects on 
the investment incentives of developers of enabling technologies. Table 1 below provides a 
symmetrical contrast between patent holdup and trespass from a transactional, systematic, and 
systemic perspective. 
 
 
Table 1. Patent holdup vs. holdout 
 
As the concepts of dominance and abuse of dominant position come from a traditional 
industrial economic perspective associated with "anti-trust", it might be beneficial to forego 
the use of industrial terms such as "holdup/out" and "patent holdup/out" for a more 
fundamental discussion on the competitive effects of an asymmetric bargaining position. This 
could be especially useful as the institutional starting point is not in a traditional vertical or 
horizontal relationship in the material value chain for physical products but in the technology 
market of standard-setting organizations (SSOs) where actors collaborate and compete in both 
a material and intellectual value chain. In an open innovation environment, such as an SSO, 
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the theoretical pro-competitive advantages must not only be compared to the theoretical anti-
competitive disadvantages but must be empirically investigated to determine the actual impact 
on the welfare of society. In turn, any policy recommendation that alters the institutional 
norms of SSOs must be judged in light of the net economic impact on society. Figure 2 below 
provides a spectrum upon which to measure the impact of asymmetric bargaining power in 
the context of technology markets, in particular, standards-enabled markets developed 
collectively through consensus-based SSOs involving SEPs and FRAND governance. The 
spectrum can be used to measure the current degree of asymmetric bargaining power as well 
as provide a model to theoretically evaluate the impact of proposed policy changes.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Asymmetric Bargaining Power Spectrum 
 
 
Empirical Evidence of Patent Trespass 
The preliminary empirical results show that the potential systematic impact of patent trespass 
manifests itself in different ways based on the heterogeneity of market actors and markets. In 
particular, multi-national corporations (MNCs) operating in developed markets were said to 
primarily deploy extensive delaying tactics with the main goal of reducing their royalty 
payments, while large firms in emerging markets (LFE) and small to medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), especially the “long tail” of microvenders, seek to avoid payment 
altogether. The latter issue is reinforced by an apparent collective action problem among 
competitors in combination with the growth of emerging markets. To illustrate, a patent 
trespass decision model is developed to explain why it is rational for SEP implementers to 
delay or avoid payment given the lack of access to injunctive relief and the transaction costs 
and uncertainty of enforcement across different jurisdictions. 
 
While patent holdup has been addressed by global competition authorities, it is less obvious 
whether patent trespass is considered a competition law issue, which raises the question of 
whether we are focusing on the right market failure regarding policy remedies for anti-
competitive behavior by SEP implementers that could have a systemic impact on economic 
efficiency, in particular, dynamic efficiency. This could manifest itself through collusion to 
change IPR policies in SSOs to reduce SEP payments or through cartelization of actors in 
emerging markets to avoid SEP payments. This study identifies several firm and industry 
level factors that would indicate an impact on economic efficiency. Preliminary evidence 
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substantiates these factors but doesn't produce conclusive results, which lead us to the 
following conclusions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The main conclusion of the study is that patent trespass is a substantial theory that needs to be 
addressed by courts and policy-makers in their decision-making processes, in particular, as a 
counterpoint to the application of patent holdup theory.  In fact, the study recommends the use 
of a new, holistic framework focused on the fundamental underlying asymmetric bargaining 
power between SEP holders and implementers to facilitate policy-makers in assessing the 
transactional, systematic, and systemic impact of current and future policies. Furthermore, due 
to the ubiquitous nature of consensus standards, market/legal norms and related policy 
changes can have a systematic and potentially systemic impact on the development of 
standards and standards-enabled markets. Thus, if injunctive relief can lead to super-FRAND 
royalty rates and royalty stacking on one hand, then the removal of injunctive relief can lead 
to sub-FRAND royalty rates and a royalty gap on the other hand.  
 
As patent holdup and trespass theory predict opposite results and implications, empirical 
evidence is required to assess the impact of actual bargaining positions on the standards-
enabled market so as to effectively advise policy. Several empirical studies have attempted to 
calculate the aggregate royalties in standards-enabled products (i.e. the royalty stack) 
(Galetovic, Haber and Zaretzki (2016); Sidak, 2016; Mallinson, 2015). This study adds to the 
discourse but more importantly urges academics and policy-makers to engage in further 
empirical studies to support better theory development and evidence-based decision-making. 
 
  
	 65	
 
5. Discussion and Future Research 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to better understand how competing interests seek to define 
the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of SEPs. This in turn sheds light on the role 
patents currently play and potentially could play in the development and commercialization of 
telecommunication standards from both an economic performance and efficiency perspective. 
In doing so, this thesis aims to provide a framework for balanced guidance to support policy 
makers and market actors seeking to define an agenda for the development of patent policies 
and IP-based business models adjusted to wealth and welfare creation in the knowledge 
economy.  
 
The previous chapter has summarized the investigations and contributions of the appended 
papers that add to an enhanced understanding of the battle to define the meaning of FRAND. 
This chapter will further discuss the overall findings of the thesis through the development of 
a preliminary model that addresses the holistic issue of the political economy of FRAND by 
mapping the market interests, ideological concepts, and the communicative game on the 
legitimizing arenas. As parts of the model are incomplete and untested, this chapter will 
conclude with areas of future research. 
 
 
5.1 Towards a Political Economy Model of FRAND and SEP Value 
 
This thesis investigates the battle among market actors to define the meaning of FRAND 
through policy interventions that seek to change the rules of the game in alignment with their 
strategic interests. While many scholars have discussed the concept of FRAND, there has not 
yet been a holistic study of the political processes behind the construction of its meaning.108 
This thesis takes a first step towards building an operative model by defining the self-assertive 
interests, key normative concepts and claims, and legitimizing arenas where the meaning of 
FRAND is being actively socially constructed. The primary goal at this stage is not to be 
exhaustive across all actors, arenas, and geographies, but to start to unveil the normative game 
whereby actors seek to define reality from the perspective of their own self-interest, whether 
economic or ideological, so as to facilitate more objective research and more effective 
decision-making.  
  
Applying the constructionist approach from section 2.1.1 to the context of SEPs, one could 
interpret from the research results of this thesis that the value of SEPs are ambiguous due to 
																																								 																				108	Political	processes	are	construed	broadly	to	encompass	all	activities	outside	of	the	private	marketplace	that	impacts	the	meaning	of	FRAND,	including	legislative,	judicial,	and	other	regulatory	actors	as	well	as	SSOs.	
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the fact that the institutional tools (i.e. rules and norms) that define reasonable royalties for 
SEPs in FRAND circumstances (i.e. blocks) are not reified – see figure 4.1 below.109  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 SEP value as a hierarchy of norms 
 
This ambiguity gives rise to opportunism, which in turn leads to litigation where courts 
attempt to better define the institutional rules and norms that allow for business strategies and 
investments to be made with more certainty. In the period of ambiguity, lobbying efforts 
primarily by industry, through politicians and even academics, intensifies with the goal of 
influencing legislators, regulators, and courts to accept their view of reality. Typically 
normative agendas are put forward as "facts", requiring both the self-interests as well as the 
arguments put forward by different actors to be deconstructed and separated for analysis. This 
discussion explores the foundations of a social constructionist model of FRAND built on the 
deconstruction of the heterogeneity of interests in the telecommunication value chain (section 
5.1.1) and the reification of FRAND on legitimizing arenas (section 5.1.2). 
 
5.1.1 Heterogeneity of Interests in the Telecommunication Value Chain 
 
Figure 5.2 below shows the creation of a new industrial dynamic within the 
telecommunication sector, which has resulted in greater division of labor including innovation 
specialists and implementation specialists together with integrated firms, who all compete in 
the same value chain with very different strategies and incentives (Geradin and Rato, 2007; 
Schmalensee, 2009). These actors interpret the patent system and anti-trust regulations 
towards the standardization process in very different ways in their search to maximize 
economic performance. In particular, the division of innovative labor, represented by Firm B 
in figure 5.2, illustrates the full transition from an MVC to an IVC logic discussed in section 
2.2.3 and Paper 3, while many integrated firms have increasingly developed strong licensing 
programs in the IVC to complement their MVC offerings. When all market actors are 
integrated firms, cross-licensing and patent pools can often be used to facilitate freedom-to-
																																								 																				109	This	would	seem	to	be	true	for	patent	damages	in	general	as	Landers	(2006)	states	that	”under	the	courts'	elastic	and	somewhat	uncertain	standards,	the	potential	forms	of	evidence	that	might	be	presented	to	a	jury	are	inestimable.”		
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operate and competition on the product market (Shapiro, 2001).110 However, it is easy to 
understand why a fragmented value chain creates different perceptions of the value of SEPs as 
implementation specialists use standards to develop markets where they can sell their 
products while innovation specialists look for a return on investment for the technology in the 
standard itself. For implementation specialists, SEPs are viewed as an added cost to their end 
product, while for innovation specialists, the standard is their product and SEPs are the means 
to benefit from their R&D investment.111 
 
 
Figure 5.2 SEPs and the new division of labor in the telecommunication value chain 
 
From a standardization perspective, firms operating in this new division of innovative labor 
(i.e. innovation specialists) are completely dependent on having their patented technology 
included in the open standards under terms that allow for them to receive a return on their 
R&D investment.112 This changes the traditional pre-competitive nature of standards 
development focused on product market competition into a high-stakes game of poker on the 
technology market. In this new IVC logic, the inclusion of a firm’s technology in the standard 
creates a competitive bargaining position against rival product firms operating downstream 
and a significant opportunity for royalties for upstream technology firms. Hybrid firms with 
both strong patent positions and product manufacturing benefit with lower costs on the 
																																								 																				110	Grindley	and	Teece	(1997)	describe	how	the	historical	role	of	patents	in	the	electronics	industry	has	been	strongly	associated	with	the	use	of	cross-licensing	agreements	between	competing	manufacturers,	which	has	been	a	norm	in	the	industry	since	the	very	beginning.	111	The	fragmentation	of	the	value	chain	provides	a	good	illustration	of	the	alienation	of	the	value	of	knowledge	in	traditional,	integrated	industrial	firms.	A	division	of	innovative	labor	forces	a	separate	accounting	of	value	for	the	knowledge	contribution	and	the	manufacturing	contribution	(i.e.	the	intellectual	and	the	material	value	chain),	which	was	previously	hidden	in	the	end	product	price	in	vertically	integrated	firms.	The	transformation	from	a	hierarchical	relationship	to	a	market	transaction	forces	the	value	of	knowledge	to	be	unveiled.	112	Firms	operating	under	this	division	of	labor	are	often	labeled	as	non-practicing	entities	(NPEs)	to	distinguish	them	from	actors	that	produce	goods	and	services.	This	distinction	is	tenuous	given	the	fact	that	many	firms	traditionally	viewed	as	practicing	have	outsourced	most	of	their	manufacturing	and	have	developed	extensive	patent	and	technology	licensing	programs.		
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product side and additional income from royalties from product actors with smaller patent 
positions in the standard. In the context of standards, patents have taken on the role of 
allowing for a new division of innovative labor by providing upstream actors a claim on their 
R&D contributions outside of the sale of products as well as offering a means for all actors to 
receive a return on their investment for their innovative efforts (Merges, 1999; Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001).113 Thus SEPs, based on FRAND commitments, have facilitated the 
development of an intellectual value chain, where value is distributed through license 
transactions to the owners of the underlying technology in parallel to the material value chain 
for the manufacture and distribution of physical products. While patents and standards have 
traditionally been depicted at odds with one another, it could be said that an increased 
dynamic use of patents and division of innovative labor in the knowledge economy makes 
patents essential (excuse the pun) to the development of most standards, as many knowledge-
based firms increasingly compete in the upstream technology market, not only the 
downstream product market.114 
 
The discussion above illustrates why the distinction between the MVC and IVC is likely 
better than practicing entities (PE) and non-practicing entities (NPE). Based on the 
transformation of the telecommunication value chain, the concept of the non-practicing entity 
(NPE) as the only actor possessing an asymmetric patent bargaining power is not tenable. The 
main distinction is not whether a firm is a practicing entity or not but instead the strength of 
the bargaining position based on the relative positions of market actors in the intellectual 
value chain (e.g. based on the relative strength of their SEP portfolios and product liability). 
Thus, two practicing entities can experience the same SEP-based bargaining asymmetry as a 
non-practicing and practicing entity from an SEP perspective. Thus the IVC offers bargaining 
power to actors that complements and competes with bargaining power traditionally reserved 
to implementing firms in the MVC. However, when the property dimension of patents is 
reduced through the weakening of injunctive relief, bargaining power can swing back in favor 
of implementing firms in the MVC through patent holdout/trespass as discussed in Paper 4. 
 
 
5.1.2  Reification of FRAND on Legitimizing Arenas  
 
The reification of institutional tools and blocks is a process of communication and acceptance, 
which can be described as a period of normative openness ending in normative closure as 
discussed in section 2.1.1. During the period of openness, stakeholders make claims that are 
eventually either accepted (possibly in modified form) or rejected by the other stakeholders. 
																																								 																				113	This	is	particularly	true	for	NPEs.	For	operating	companies,	the	inclusion	of	in-house	technology	in	the	standard	could	also	provide	manufacturing	advantages	as	the	contributing	company	has	more	tacit	knowledge	related	to	their	own	technology.	This	discussion	does	not	include	non-SEPs,	which	represent	innovative,	valuable	solutions	outside	of	the	implementation	of	the	standard.	114	It	should	be	noted	that	the	concepts	of	”upstream”	and	”downstream”	as	well	as	”vertical”	and	”horizontal”	arise	from	a	material	value	chain	logic	and	are	not	directly	transferable	to	an	intellectual	value	chain,	which	operates	under	a	different	logic.	However,	these	concepts	can	be	useful	when	describing	the	intellectual	value	chain	in	relation	to	the	material	value	chain	in	an	integrated	value	chain/network.	
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However, communicative claims require structural legitimacy (i.e. reified platforms where 
institutional tools are defined and accepted). Communicative claims can thus be seen as a 
game that takes place among different actors across different arenas as described in section 
2.1.2. These different actors vie to have their claims of social reality accepted on these key 
arenas through various means of persuasion. 
 
Using the example of patents in the context of standards we can construct an extended model 
of five key arenas where FRAND as a tool and specific SEPs as building blocks are being 
communicatively claimed by influential stakeholders (see figure 5.3 below).115 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 FRAND as a communicative game on five arenas 
 
Below is a brief description of each of the arenas from a US perspective: 
 
Business Arena 
This arena consists of commercial actors and associated market and financial institutions 
involved in the development and implementation of technology, products, and services in 
standards-enabled markets. It is placed in the middle because patent value is ultimately 
created and extracted in this arena through the influence and constraints of the other arenas.116 
Actors on this arena typically make communicative claims in their own economic interests 
(i.e. either short term or long term) and attempt to influence both the norms on the business 
arena (e.g. through new knowledge-based business models) as well as influence the 
development of norms in the other four arenas that collectively impact the meaning of 
FRAND. This is done through direct and indirect actions that affect specific SEPs as well the 
general concept of FRAND (i.e. both on the block and tool level). Direct actions focused on 
specific technology contributions or SEPs include, for example, participation in the 
development of new standards through an SSO, filing patents and requesting reexaminations 
																																								 																				
115	Note	that	the	model	is	focused	on	the	US	perspective,	but	is	also	transferable	to	other	countries	(minus	the	ITC	arena)	and	could	be	used	to	evaluate	the	global	development	of	FRAND.	116	Note	that	most	litigation	is	resolved	outside	of	the	courts,	and	even	when	court	decisions	are	made,	business	actors	often	negotiate	a	settlement	in	the	shadow	of	a	potential	appeal.	
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at the USPTO or other PTOs, participation as a litigant in a court or ITC proceeding, filing an 
antitrust complaint, and negotiation of FRAND licenses with other market actors. Indirect 
actions focused on redefining FRAND include, among others, lobbying for legislative change, 
filing amicus briefs to influence courts and regulatory actors, proposing changes to SSO IPR 
policies, and supporting academic and media channels. The business arena, in turn, is directly 
influenced by antitrust and SSO policies, legal norms and judicial rulings, and the competitive 
strategy of the different market actors.  Firms operating in different parts of the value chain 
view FRAND and the value of SEPs differently, which creates a disequilibrium of interests 
that incentivizes and facilitates an environment for opportunistic behavior through direct and 
indirect means. While this has resulted in prolonged FRAND negotiations, increased 
litigation, and recently, the need for FRAND royalty rates to be determined by the courts, 
standards-enabled markets have historically shown signs of considerable success in general.117 
 
Judicial Arena 
This arena consists primarily of the federal district court system that adjudicates patent cases, 
including the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and the Supreme Court. Courts 
are influenced directly by legislation, procedural law, expert testimony, and the argumentation 
of the litigants and indirectly through amicus briefs submitted by concerned 3rd parties. Court 
decisions have direct impact on specific SEP portfolios through the determination of patent 
validity, infringement, essentiality, damages, and ongoing FRAND royalties as well as 
through injunctive relief. In addition, court rulings also have a systemic effect on the meaning 
of SEPs and FRAND by creating new procedural law that impacts future courts and market 
expectations as discussed in all the appended papers. This includes, for example, the 
interpretation of Georgia-Pacific Factors, ex ante valuation, royalty stacking, royalty base, 
injunctive relief, and patent holdup from a FRAND perspective.  
 
ITC Arena 
In addition, the judicial arena there exists in the US a quasi-judicial entity known as the 
International Trade Commission (ITC), which has the authority to block entry into the US of 
imported goods that are deemed to infringe US patents.118 The ITC reports to Congress, 
POTUS, and the US Trade Representative (USTR) and is influenced by changes in legislation 
and the veto power of the President and USTR. Recent shifts by US district courts to a more 
stringent test for injunctive relief in combination with the fact that most telecommunication 
products are imported to the US has generated increased caseload at the ITC based on its 
ability and perceived willingness by patent holders to grant exclusion orders.119 Thus SEP 
holders have petitioned the ITC for exclusion orders against implementing firms that infringe 
their SEP portfolios. For example, in 2013 an exclusion order was granted by the ITC 
blocking certain Apple products for import in the US-based on infringement of SEPs owned 
by Samsung. However, USTR through delegation from POTUS vetoed the order citing 
																																								 																				117	See	Galetovic	et	al.	(2015),	which	shows	that	SEP-reliant	industries	have	the	fastest	quality-adjusted	price	declines	in	the	US	economy.	
118	See	19	U.S.C.	§	1337	119	See	Chien	and	Lemley	(2012),	who	describe	the	rush	to	the	ITC	after	the	eBay	decision.	
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agreement with the guidelines with USDOJ-USPTO policy statement on FRAND remedies.120 
Despite the previous veto, the ITC in 2015 issued an exclusion order against Nokia (now 
MMO) for the infringement of an SEP owned by Interdigital, providing in its decision the 
information requested in the previous USTR veto letter, in particular, the justification that 
MMO was practicing patent holdout as an unwilling licensee. This opens the door for ITC-
based exclusion orders under the circumstance of refusal to license on FRAND terms. 
 
Antitrust Arena 
The key regulatory actors in the antitrust arena in the US are the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ). The FTC is a quasi-
judicial, independent organization charged with preventing anticompetitive business practices 
and protecting consumers.121 The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice has a similar 
role of promoting competition and enforcing antitrust laws. Together, these actors have direct 
influence in determining the antitrust implications of IP transactions through, for example, 
evaluating mergers and acquisitions involving large SEP portfolios122 and providing business 
review letters (BRLs) regarding cross-licensing, patent pool formation, and SSO IPR 
policies.123 They also conduct investigations into the alleged anticompetitive use of FRAND-
enabled SEPs by individual market actors.124 
 
Standard Setting Organization (SSO) Arena 
This arena consists of various national and international organizations whose primary role is 
to define technical standards and publish the associated technical specifications. There are a 
great number and variety of standard setting organizations (SSOs) with the role of facilitating 
the collaborative development of industry standards.125  While SSOs are generally considered 
to be pro-competitive, collective participation by competing firms creates an environment for 
opportunistic behavior with potential anti-competitive effects (Anton and Yao, 1995). Many 
SSOs are private, non-profit organizations governed by private members, either individual 
professionals as with IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) or organizations 
as with ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute). In addition, countries can 
also be members as is the case with ITU (International Telecommunication Union), which is a 
UN agency. Given that the actors in the business arena can also be members in the SSOs, 
there is a potential conflict of interest in the development of objective technical standards that 
must be overcome. This is particularly challenging due to the asymmetric distribution of 
market power in SSOs with predominantly corporate members. A recent controversial change 
																																								 																				120	See	https://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJ-PTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-
13.pdf.		121	See	https://www.ftc.gov		122	For	example	see	DOJ	investigation	of	Google’s	purchase	of	Motorola	Mobility,	and	Rockstar	consortium’s	purchase	of	the	Nortel	patent	portfolio	123	For	example,	the	DOJ	has	issued	BRLs	for	3G,	MPEG-2,	and	DVD	patent	pools	and	for	SSO	IPR	policies	for	IEEE	and	VITA	–	see	http://www.justice.gov/atr/business-reviews			124	For	example,	see	FTC	consent	orders	in	the	cases	of	Unocal,	Dell,	Rambus,	Google/MMI	(https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1210120/motorola-mobility-llc-google-inc-matter)	and	Robert	Bosch	(https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1210081/bosch-robert-bosch-gmbh).		125	Bekkers	and	Updegrove	(2012)	identified	over	840	SSOs	in	the	ICT	sector	alone.	
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in IPR policy at IEEE illustrates how SSOs can be used as an important arena to define the 
meaning of FRAND (Petit, 2016; Teece, 2015; Sidak, 2015). 
 
From the brief descriptions above it is easy to see how different actors can play a 
communicative game on different arenas to try to enact their claims as a means to affect not 
only the validity of specific commercial building blocks but also the validity of the tools that 
are used to build them. While the different arenas have their own logic, they are also part of 
an interrelated system of design, development, validation, and enforcement. Additional 
arenas, such as legislative (i.e. Congress) and administrative (i.e. USPTO) could also be 
added to this communicative system defining the meaning of FRAND.  
 
Figure 5.6 below shows an influence diagram describing how market interests can impact the 
meaning of FRAND through the legitimizing arenas discussed above. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Influence diagram of legitimizing arenas defining the meaning of FRAND 
 
5.2 Future Research 
 
The interrelated issues of telecommunication standards, patents, and FRAND agreements 
could be seen to part of a greater movement that is redefining the role of intellectual property 
and open innovation in the knowledge economy. Below is a list of important areas for future 
research: 
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• A broader investigation of FRAND decision-making by courts, competition 
authorities, and SSOs worldwide 
• A deeper political economy investigation of FRAND building on the social 
construction model presented in section 5.1. 
• A deeper investigation of the role of competition law and the impact of the 
competition authorities in relation to technology standards involving actors with 
heterogeneous business models. 
• Further economic modeling and empirical studies of patent holdup and holdout in 
relation to knowledge-based business models. 
• A comparative study of different technology standards in relation to patents, 
performance, and interoperability. 
• An international comparative study of FRAND norms in the different arenas. 
• A new look at how the emerging Internet-of-Things (IoT) impacts standardization 
strategies and the role of SEPs and FRAND agreements. 
• The continued examination of mainstream law and economic concepts towards the 
development of an improved knowledge-based theory of value, in particular, for open 
innovation platforms that use intellectual property to facilitate openness and regulate 
access. 
 
  
	 74	
6. Conclusion 
 
The use of FRAND has a long history as an antitrust remedy and a governance structure for 
collaborative technology development. This thesis focuses on the recent battle to define the 
meaning of FRAND over the last decade from 2007-2017 set in the context of the large and 
globally expanding telecommunications market enabled by open, consensus-based standards. 
While much of the attention in the popular press has focused on the war between Apple and 
Samsung, this thesis has focused on the potentially more important intellectual property battle 
concerning the future of telecommunications standards in the knowledge economy. It has 
been shown in this thesis that this parallel conflict is not a conventional battle over the market 
share of products between horizontal competitors on product markets, but a battle among 
vertical collaborators over the appropriation of value between upstream technology owners 
and downstream product implementers. As such, the current conflict in the context of open 
telecommunication standards could be seen as part of a wider paradigm shift from an 
industrial to a knowledge economy characterized by the increased direct commercialization of 
technology through intellectual property-based business models. While the smartphone is one, 
albeit important, product, the future development of Internet of Things (IoT) both for 
industrial applications (i.e. Industry 4.0) and consumer applications is predicted to greatly 
expand the number of connected objects as well as the number of technology standards and 
associated patents. Given the increasing importance of standards, this thesis can be viewed as 
an effort towards addressing the growing contention over how patents should be governed in 
the development and commercialization of open technology standards to maximize social 
welfare. The following sections discuss the key findings and main contributions. 
 
6.1 Key Findings  
 
The main purpose of this thesis has been to better understand how competing interests seek to 
define the meaning of FRAND and influence the value of SEPs. The following questions 
were addressed in the context of the telecommunications industry and below are the key 
findings: 
 
1. What are the current areas of contention regarding FRAND and the value of 
SEPs and how does this relate to the interests of actors on the telecommunication 
value chain? 
 
The main area of contention among market actors is concerned with the determination of the 
distribution of rents among SEP holders and implementers in the telecommunication value 
chain.126 In particular, the fragmentation of the telecommunication value chain has created 
																																								 																				
126	There	are	important	non-market	actors	in	the	overall	telecommunication	eco-system,	including	policy-oriented	organizations,	such	as	competition	authorities	focus	on	the	welfare	impacts	associated	with	balancing	the	needs	of	innovation	and	consumers.	Additionally,	standard-setting	organizations	(SSOs)	occupy	the	role	of	managing	open	innovation	platforms	that	benefit	both	their	members	and	society	and	influence	FRAND	through	the	setting	of	IPR	policies.		
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increasing asymmetric incentives among market actors that develop and implement standards. 
This has created the need to value SEPs outside of the context of the traditional industrial 
material value chain, which in turn creates a battle to define the meaning of FRAND within 
the context of large, competing commercial interests. Standards with different market norms 
based on the type of technology and the business models of its members can view FRAND 
and SEP value very differently. 
 
2. What are the key theoretical concepts currently used to define the meaning of 
FRAND and how do they impact the value of SEPs? 
 
Patent holdup and holdout have emerged as the most important theoretical concepts used to 
define the meaning of FRAND. It was found that neither patent holdup nor patent holdout is 
aligned with the mainstream economic theories of holdup and holdout, respectively. A new 
framework is suggested that removes the pejorative terms and models the potential 
asymmetric bargaining positions between SEP holder and implementers on a continuum 
across a spectrum from monopoly to monopsony power. 
 
The key sub-concepts include argumentation over aggregate royalties (i.e. royalty stack/gap), 
injunctive relief, ex ante valuation, and the royalty base. The literature and cases studied 
showed a lack of empirical evidence of systematic or systemic patent holdup but growing 
evidence of systemic patent holdout/trespass in the telecommunication market due to 
decreased inability to obtain injunctive relief and the difficulty of SEP enforcement in 
emerging economies. This creates a rational incentive on the part of multi-national SEP 
implementers to delay payment of FRAND royalties and small and large firms in emerging 
countries to avoid FRAND payments based on collective action problems. No significant 
systemic impact from patent holdout is currently observed in the mobile telecommunication 
market, but there are signs that should be further investigated and monitored. 
 
3. How is the meaning of FRAND shaped by actors through key legitimizing arenas, 
such as the US court system? 
 
Market actors shape of the meaning of FRAND and the value of SEPs through market 
transactions as well as through interventions on other legitimizing arenas, including SSOs, 
courts, competition authorities, the International Trade Commission (ITC), and through 
legislation. The results showed that the US court system is willing to accept a broad range of 
patent damages theories/models if they substantially account for the apportionment of SEP 
value. The legal norms of SSPPU and EMVR are applied within the context of the case, 
allowing for the inclusion of market norms to influence the determination of royalty base in 
SEP damages. Different countries currently apply different market and legal norms in 
defining the meaning of FRAND thus further research into other arenas and geographies is 
required to construct a global understanding of the meaning of FRAND and SEP value. 
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6.2 Main Contributions  
 
To accomplish the purpose and investigate the main questions of this thesis, four interrelated 
studies were conducted and one synthesizing framework has been put forward to capture the 
results. In particular, the phenomena of SEPs and FRAND agreements were investigated from 
an inter-disciplinary perspective, specifically economics, law, and innovation/technology 
management. This was done to provide balanced guidance to support policymakers and 
market actors seeking to define an agenda for the development of patent policies and IP-based 
business models adjusted to wealth and welfare creation in an era of open innovation.  
 
The overarching research problem addressed in this thesis is the need for an improved 
theoretical understanding of the changing nature of value creation from an industrial to a 
knowledge-based economic paradigm. This could also be described as the need for an 
improved knowledge-based theory of value at the level of the firm and the market – both the 
technology and product market. The following theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
thesis are summarized below. 
 
6.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
 
The theoretical activities and results of the thesis are discussed below: 
 
• Verification of key areas of contention on FRAND and SEP value through analysis of 
landmark FRAND cases in relation to received theory (Paper 1/2)  
• Development of new propositions of SEP value based on the business model/market 
logic, standardization context, royalty base and valuation models as well as 
verification of lack of empirical evidence of patent holdup and royalty stacking (Paper 
2) 
• Development of a knowledge-based theory of competitive advantage and SEP value 
based on vertical competition between actors on the product and technology market 
(i.e. the interaction between the material and intellectual value chain) in the context of 
the telecommunication value chain (Paper 3) 
• Creation of five propositions regarding the relationship between patent damages and 
royalty base from an intellectual value chain perspective (Paper 3): 
o The value of knowledge is not constrained by the material value chain 
o Components are not licensed in the telecommunication value chain 
o Market norms are to license SEPs on fully-compliant end products 
o Standards drive market demand by definition in relation to EMVR 
o Market norms are embedded in SEP license agreements 
• Critical revision of received theory of patent holdup and holdout leading to new 
theoretical concepts/propositions including patent trespass and royalty gap (Paper 4) 
• Development of a new decision model of patent trespass (Paper 4) 
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• Development of a new model of asymmetric bargaining power in the context of SEP 
holders and implementers (Paper 4) 
• Verification of patent trespass strategies against empirical survey of global SEP 
holders (Paper 4) 
• Creation of three initial models describing the political economy of FRAND and SEP 
value to unveil the communicative game and interests influencing policy and strategy 
(Summary chapter) 
o SEPs and the new division of labor in the telecommunication value chain 
o FRAND as a communicative game on five arenas 
o Influence diagram of legitimizing arenas defining the meaning of FRAND 
 
 
6.2.2 Empirical contributions 
 
The key empirical investigations and results of the thesis are discussed below:  
 
• Description of landmark FRAND case from a techno-economic perspective and key 
implications for firms and policymakers (Paper 1) 
• Description and comparative analysis of SEP valuation models presented and accepted 
in four initial FRAND case before the US district court system (Paper 2) 
• Doctrinal analysis of US patent law in relation to patent damages in general and SEP 
damages in particular (Paper 3) 
• Description and comparative analysis of commercial transactions on a product and 
technology market regarding the norms of royalty base between the 
computer/semiconductor industry and the telecommunications industry (Paper 3) 
• Description of patent trespass strategies based on interviews of global SEP holders 
(Paper 4) 
• Description of the nature and impact of patent trespass based on survey of global SEP 
holders (Paper 4) 
 
Further theoretical and empirical contributions can be found in the appended papers or the 
summaries in chapter 4. 
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